# 1AC

### Plan

#### The United States Department of Energy should approve the United States Enrichment Corporation’s currently pending application for a $2 billion loan guarantee for the American Centrifuge Project.

### Contention 1 Solvency

#### ACP key to domestic uranium enrichment capability

**Holt and Nikitin ’12 –** specialist in energy policy and specialist in nuclear nonproliferation

(Mark and Mary Beth, “Potential sources for nuclear fuel for tritium production”, Congressional Research Service, 5-15-2012, http://markey.house.gov/sites/markey.house.gov/files/documents/2012\_0515\_CRS\_TritiumFuelOptions.pdf)

Tritium, produced in nuclear reactors, is an essential ingredient in U.S. nuclear warheads and must be regularly replenished as it radioactively decays. The need for a domestic fuel supplier for tritium production reactors has been cited as a justification for providing government assistance to USEC. USEC Inc. was established in 1998 through the public sale of a government corporation, the U.S. Enrichment Corporation, pursuant to the USEC Privatization Act (P.L. 104-134). The company enriches uranium in the fissile isotope U-235 (increasing the proportion of U-235 from the level found in natural uranium) for use as fuel by nuclear power plants. USEC leases an enrichment plant in Paducah, KY, from the Department of Energy (DOE). Built in the late 1950s, the Paducah plant uses an enrichment technology known as gaseous diffusion, in which uranium hexafluoride gas is pumped through permeable barriers to separate the major isotopes of uranium. As the isotopes are separated, U-235 is concentrated in a product stream, while the non-fissile isotope U-238 becomes more concentrated in a waste stream (or tails). USEC plans to replace the Paducah plant with a new plant at a DOE site near Piketon, OH, that would use advanced centrifuges to separate the isotopes, called the American Centrifuge Plant. The $150 million requested in the FY2013 Department of Energy budget justification is to support R&D activities for the American Centrifuge Plant. DOE currently produces tritium by irradiating lithium-6 in the Watts Bar 1 commercial reactor (in Tennessee) and may expand the program to the two-reactor Sequoyah nuclear plant (also in Tennessee) as well, both of which are owned and operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Because the tritium is to be used in nuclear weapons, the Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah reactors **may not be allowed to use fuel from foreign sources** or even some domestic uranium. U-234 is necessary for the production of tritium. USEC Inc. is the current supplier of fuel for tritium production. Thus, if USEC were to cease enrichment operations, it has been argued, U.S. tritium production could be jeopardized because of a lack of alternative fuel from a solely domestic source.

#### Foreign suppliers can’t solve ---- treaty obligations and they won’t supply military-purpose uranium

Holt and Nikitin ’12 – specialist in energy policy and specialist in nuclear nonproliferation

(Mark and Mary Beth, “Potential sources for nuclear fuel for tritium production”, Congressional Research Service, 5-15-2012, http://markey.house.gov/sites/markey.house.gov/files/documents/2012\_0515\_CRS\_TritiumFuelOptions.pdf)

The European consortium Urenco is one of USEC’s major competitors. Urenco recently began operating a centrifuge enrichment plant in New Mexico, which is expected to reach a capacity of 5.8 million separative work units (SWU) by 2015. The New Mexico plant is operated by Urenco subsidiary Louisiana Enrichment Service (LES), so named because the facility was originally planned for Louisiana. Construction of Urenco’s New Mexico plant was authorized by the 1992 Washington Agreement between the United States and the three members of the Urenco consortium: Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 2 Article III of the agreement, Peaceful Use, states that the New Mexico plant shall only be used for peaceful, non-explosive purposes. The special nuclear material produced by the plant, enriched uranium, as well as any special nuclear material produced in a reactor using the enriched uranium, such as plutonium, is also restricted to peaceful uses. Urenco has signed a contract with TVA to supply enrichment services from its New Mexico plant to the Watts Bar and Sequoyah reactors. This arrangement raised questions about whether the TVA plants could be used to make tritium for nuclear warheads while being fueled by enriched uranium from Urenco. A 2008 legal memorandum to NNSA concluded that the Washington Agreement did not preclude such use of the Urenco-produced nuclear fuel, because tritium is not defined as special nuclear material, but rather as byproduct material. A Joint Committee of the Urenco consortium, after being briefed on the issue at a 2005 meeting, did not object to the TVA contract. 3 A Urenco official said that although the company does not object to TVA tritium production with its enriched uranium, **current DOE policy would not approve the transfer**. 4 An NNSA official said U.S. treaty obligations prevent fuel enriched by Urenco from being used for tritium production: The answer in general for Urenco is that its enrichment technology has peaceful use restrictions, consistent with section 123(a)(3) of the Atomic Energy Act and our treaty with Euratom [an association of European countries that use nuclear energy], that prevent its deployment in support of nuclear weapons programs or for any military purpose.

#### Foreign sources kill credibility of our nuclear arsenal

**Jones ’12 – senior fellow at the Bipartisan Policy Center**

(James L., retired general and co-chairman of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Energy Project and was national security adviser to President Obama from January 2009 to November 2010, “US must remain leader in nuclear enrichment”, The Hill, 1-17-2012, http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/204711-us-must-remain-leader-in-nuclear-enrichment-)

The disappearance of a domestically owned capability would not only undermine U.S. leadership in a highly consequential arena of global commerce and security, it would render us dependent on foreign-controlled sources of uranium enrichment. This could **increase the vulnerability** not only of America’s commercial nuclear industry but of our national nuclear arsenal. Tritium, produced using enriched uranium, is necessary to maintain and modernize our nuclear weapons. Relying on foreign suppliers for material essential for maintaining the safety, security and reliability of our nuclear capability is unacceptable. It is critical that the federal government continue to invest in the research and development of technologies necessary to sustain modern and commercially viable domestic enrichment capability. Toward this end, the Department of Energy has requested congressional authorization to repurpose $300 million dollars to support continued R&D over the next two years. Unfortunately, the initial $150 million needed to demonstrate new technologies was not included in the recent spending bill. There is controversy over the appropriate role of the federal government in supporting technology commercialization. We must not let this debate negatively affect U.S. national security or our continued commitment to energy R&D vital to America’s energy, economic and national security — a role that has always, appropriately, received overwhelming bipartisan support.

#### Domestic production key to reduce vulnerabilities of the supply chain

Rowny ’12 – retired Lieutenant General

(Edward Rowny, was chief negotiator with the rank of ambassador in the START arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and has served as an arms control adviser and negotiator for five presidents, Roll Call, 3-29-2012, http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57\_118/edward-rowny-safe-uranium-enrichment-should-be-us-priority-213505-1.html)

Oil may grab headlines, but nuclear power for civilian use is growing, as it should. It is efficient, extremely safe and friendly to the environment. As with oil, the U.S. would be wise to produce its own supply of enriched uranium, the fuel for nuclear power plants. Farming out the process to other nations — or to companies headquartered overseas — is risky and increases our vulnerabilities. The U.S. government should pay more attention than it has in recent years to the nation’s dwindling ability to enrich its own uranium. The consequences of doing otherwise could be dramatic. Our country could **find itself at the mercy** of foreigners who do not have our best interests at heart. Energy independence, a laudable aspiration for oil, is even more essential for nuclear power. Domestically produced supplies of enriched uranium are already running short. The U.S. once produced most of the world’s enriched uranium. Now we’re down to about a quarter of the world’s supply. For reasons of national security, we shouldn’t dip further. That’s why the president should be praised for requesting $150 million in next year’s National Nuclear Security Administration budget to keep uranium enrichment alive on our soil. In the meantime, Chu has asked Congress for the authority to reallocate his current budget resources for that purpose until next year’s budget is enacted. Without this cash infusion, American technology at a major facility in rural Ohio will face an uncertain future. We can’t afford the *uncertainty*. Military considerations also play a role here. Nuclear weapons, while thankfully on the decline, still exist and must be maintained and updated. International treaties mandate that tritium, a rare, radioactive isotope that’s a byproduct of enriched uranium use in nuclear reactors and is critical to the proper, safe functioning of nuclear weapons, must be made with U.S. technology. Unless U.S. technology is available to make the enriched uranium needed to produce tritium, our national security will be at risk.

**Granting USEC the loan guarantee is critical to third party financing and credibility for the ACP—technical feasibility and other hurdles have already been met**

**Schmidt ‘9 – Former U.S. Representative**

**(Jean Schmidt, speech from Congress, “Where are the Jobs?”, 7-29-2009, http://votesmart.org/public-statement/445368/where-are-the-jobs)**

The United States Enrichment Corporation, called USEC, is deploying American Centrifuge technology to provide the dependable, long-term, U.S.-owned and developed nuclear fuel production capability needed to support the country's nuclear power plants, nuclear submarines, and a robust nuclear deterrent. Mr. Speaker, we have dozens of nuclear power plants in this country that all require nuclear fuel. And we have a Navy who, as I speak, is sailing in every ocean across the globe. And we have weapons of mass destruction that will become a useless deterrent without fresh tritium. Without the American Centrifuge Plant, in 5 years' time, we will have no ability in the United States to enrich uranium to keep our lights on, our ships at sea, or a deterrent potential. In 5 years, we will be forced to purchase uranium from foreign suppliers as we do with most of our oil. I don't want to depend on foreigners for this kind of product. The American Centrifuge Plant holds great promise. Unfortunately, in order to meet this promise, USEC needed a loan guarantee from the Federal Government. Now, I want to repeat that. It needed a loan guarantee from the Federal Government. You see, USEC has already invested $1.5 billion and has offered another billion dollars of corporate support. It did this with the expectation that the Department of Energy would make available a $2 billion loan guarantee needed to finance the full-scale deployment of the American Centrifuge Plants. Now, I want to refer to this chart here. Why were they so confident in that? Well, you see on September 2, 2008, when President Obama was running for election, he wrote a letter to our Governor, Ted Strickland. This is the full letter so you can see it. I'm not taking it out of context. He said, Under my administration, energy programs that promote safe and environmentally sound technologies and are domestically produced, such as the enrichment facility in Ohio, will have my full support. I will work with the Department of Energy to help make loan guarantees available for this and other advanced energy programs that reduce carbon emissions and break the tie to high-cost and foreign-energy sources. This is what this letter said. So you understand that USEC was very, very confident that they were going to get that loan guarantee. But instead, on Monday night, the Department of Energy really pulled the rug out from all of us. I got a phone call asking me to call the White House, and I learned Monday night that the Department of Energy was going to withdraw its promise and they were actually asking USEC to withdraw its application and to try it again in 18 months. I was actually told on the phone that if they did that, then the Department of Energy would give them $45 million, $30 million, and another $15 million if they would rescind this. And that kind of shocked me. The next day it also shocked the folks at USEC because, you see, they had this letter that the President had given to our Governor, Ted Strickland, that said those loan guarantees would be given. Mr. Speaker, the American Centrifuge Plant currently supports more than 5,700 jobs and will help create 2,300 more within a year of commencement of the loan-guarantee funding. That's 2,300 additional jobs to my district. Now, because the Department of Energy has contradicted a promise that our President made in September of last year to our Governor and to those men and women in this area of the State, those jobs are in jeopardy. And I was on the phone with one of my constituents earlier today. Pink slips are being given out at the USEC plant. The Department of Energy has told the media the reasons for their denial were threefold: the cost subsidy estimate, a new requirement for another $300 million of capital, and the questions of technology. Well, the first question offered by the DOE is a little laughable. It turns out that the government isn't really backing these loans. Instead, the Department of Energy is charging a risk-of-failure fee to each of the folks that agrees to back the loans. These fees are pulled together to eliminate any risk to the taxpayers that actually have been given a loan guarantee. They determined that the fee for this loan would be $800 million on a $2 billion loan. So USEC is supposed to come up with $800 million on a $2 billion loan. I don't know about you, but in my neck of the woods, we call that like loan sharking. The second reason for denying the guarantee is a new need to set aside an additional 300 million for contingencies. Well, I can think where you and I see that that is headed. After the risk premium is paid, apparently USEC still has to come up with more money to make the Department of Energy feel more comfortable about giving these loans. But the last question, I think, is the most surprising, because the last reason is one where they say they have got technical questions, and this is the one that is the most absurd of all, because, quite frankly, this technology is out there. France is using it, England is using it. Would it surprise you to know, Mr. Speaker, that Iran is using it? But what I found most disturbing is that the Department of Energy hired a technology expert, as required by law, and they went through the technology and wrote a long report, and in fact the guy ran back to give it to the Department of Energy on Tuesday. That was the day after the Department of Energy made their decision. They made that decision on Monday night. They made it without any regard for the report they were relying on for this very important project. It is not just a project, Mr. Speaker, that continues to help the folks in my district. And it is important to me, because, Mr. Speaker, this is my district, and these are my folks and these are my friends. I have become friends with these people. This is the part of my community that doesn't have a lot of job opportunities, and they welcomed this job opportunity. They embraced it. And I believe that the President believes in this project, as he stated on September 2, 2008. But I think there must be some sort of disconnect with the Department of Energy. There is a chart here, and I would like to go through the chart a little bit again so we can clearly understand what is going on. The issue: credit subsidy cost estimated by the DOE to be $800 million. Well, let me be a little clearer. The estimate was never provided in writing. The methods of calculation were never disclosed or explained. An $800 million subsidy cost is not reasonable. I think it is outrageous, given USEC's fully collateralized $1 billion parent guarantee, standard credit, and, yes, yield exposures of $24 million to $74 million based on credit ratings of C to BB-minus and assets recoveries of only 20 to 30 percent of the cost. The DOE calculation clearly ignores the value of $1.5 billion invested by USEC to date and another billion of non-project collateral offered by USEC, consisting primarily of natural and enriched uranium inventories. The second issue, an additional need for $300 million of additional capital. USEC offered a legally binding capital commitment, which DOE agreed met statutory and regulatory requirements. USEC's fully collateralized $1 billion parent guarantee designed to permit loan to commerce while USEC raised additional equity while fully protecting the taxpayers. USEC's financial adviser stated that **with the loan guarantee, $100 million to $150 million of capital could be raised in the public market.** USEC has commenced discussions with strategic suppliers to obtain vendor financing for the balance. And the final, the technical readiness of American Centrifuge Technology. The DOE LGPO concluded that ACT was not ready to move to commercial scale operations prior to receiving the independent engineer's written assessment. The independent engineer had only been working for 12 days when DOE acted. DOE was scheduled to review the classified independent engineer report on July 28, and the DOE representative traveled to Tennessee to do so, unaware of the LGPO's decision the night before. American Centrifuge is based on technology which DOE initially developed in the 1970s and the 1980s and subsequently operated it for 10 years. USEC-approved centrifuges have been operating in the Lead Cascade for over 225,000 hours. The DOE has acknowledged that USEC met the milestone under the 2002 agreement between DOE and USEC, which requires obtaining satisfactory reliability and performance data from Lead Cascade operations, the last requirement to be met besides obtaining financing prior to commencing commercial plant construction and operations. Mr. Speaker, I don't understand what is going on here, I don't think that this body understands what is going on here, and I am not even sure that the President even understands what is going on here with the Department of Energy. But I am very confused. More than that, I am very outraged because I believe that we have to have energy independence, but we also have to have security for this Nation. Energy independence depends upon a variety of sources of energy, including nuclear power, but you have to have the stuff to make that nuclear power. In 5 years, we will no longer be the people that are producing the stuff that it takes to make that nuclear power. That is why this project is so important, not just for the 2,000 jobs that will be lost.

**Unconditional plan is key—further delays or roadblocks means USEC would pull out of the project**

**USEC ‘12**

**(“Funding”, 2012, http://www.usec.com/american-centrifuge/what-american-centrifuge/plant/funding)**

USEC needs **significant additional financing** in order to complete the American Centrifuge Plant. USEC believes a loan guarantee under the DOE Loan Guarantee Program, which was established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, is essential to obtaining the funding needed to complete the American Centrifuge Plant. In July 2008, USEC applied under the DOE Loan Guarantee Program for $2 billion in U.S. government guaranteed debt financing for the American Centrifuge Plant. Instead of moving forward with a conditional commitment for a loan guarantee, in the fall of 2011, DOE proposed a two-year RD&D program for the project. DOE indicated that USEC’s application for a DOE loan guarantee would remain pending during the RD&D program **but has given USEC no assurance that a successful RD&D program will result in a loan guarantee**. Additional capital beyond the $2 billion of DOE loan guarantee funding that USEC has applied for and USEC’s internally generated cash flow will be required to complete the project. USEC has had discussions with Japanese export credit agencies regarding financing up to $1 billion of the cost of completing the American Centrifuge Plant. Additional capital will also be needed and the amount of additional capital is dependent on a number of factors, including the amount of any revised cost estimate and schedule for the project, the amount of contingency or other capital DOE may require as part of a loan guarantee, and the amount of the DOE credit subsidy cost that would be required to be paid in connection with a loan guarantee. USEC has no assurances that it will be successful in obtaining this financing and that the delays it has experienced will not adversely affect these efforts. If **conditions change** and deployment of the American Centrifuge Plant becomes no longer **probable or becomes delayed** significantly from USEC’s current expectations, USEC could expense up to the full amount of previously capitalized costs related to the American Centrifuge Plant of up to $1.1 billion. Events that could impact USEC’s views as to the probability of deployment or USEC’s projections include progress in meeting the technical milestones of the RD&D program, the status of continued DOE funding for the RD&D program, changes in USEC’s anticipated ownership of or role in the project, changes in the cost estimate and schedule for the project, and prospects for obtaining a loan guarantee and other financing needed to deploy the project.

**DOE key—without its backing key investors would pull out of the project**

**Duffy ’11 – investment expert at Motley Fool**

**(Aimee, “Will the Government Guarantee Your Uranium Stock?”, The Motley Fool, 10-7-2011, http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2011/10/07/will-the-government-guarantee-your-uranium-stock.aspx#lastVisibleParagraph)**

The U.S. Department of Energy can be such a tease sometimes -- just ask the uranium enrichment outfit USEC (NYSE: USU ) . The company has been in **hurry-up-and-wait mode** for more than two years now, eagerly anticipating a DOE decision on a $2 billion loan guarantee for its American Centrifuge project that has yet to materialize. The company has been **forced to negotiate extensions** **with its two main investors**, Toshiba and Babcock and Wilcox (NYSE: BWC ) , for the second time in two months. The companies have agreed to stay tied to the project, and their respective $100 million investments, until Oct. 31. A key process in the production of nuclear fuel for power plants, uranium enrichment increases the U235 isotope and decreases the U238 isotope in naturally occurring uranium. The U235 isotope is the only one that is fissionable, therefore the only one that can be used as nuclear fuel. USEC plans to use the American Centrifuge to separate the isotopes and sell the U235 to its customers. USEC desperately needs a conditional commitment from the DOE by the end of the month. The company provides more than 50% of enriched uranium in the United States but has issues with liquidity. The new centrifuge project is expected to provide 20% of the U.S. electricity supply but cannot go forward without help from the DOE. **Continued support from Toshiba and Babcock and Wilcox is also contingent on DOE commitment.** As it stands now, USEC has already directed certain suppliers to suspend work and has informed employees that layoffs may or may not be just around the bend.

### Contention 2 Deterrence

#### First, deterrence controls the escalation of conflicts and disputes to nuclear war

Robinson ‘1 – president of the DOE Sandia National Laboratory

(C. Paul Robinson**,** president and director of the Department of Energy Sandia National Laboratories, “A White Paper: Pursuing a New Nuclear Weapons Policy for the 21st Century,” 3/22/2001, http://www.nukewatch.org/importantdocs/resources/pursuing\_a\_new\_nuclear\_weapons\_p.html)

I served as an arms negotiator on the last two agreements before the dissolution of the Soviet Union and have spent most of my career enmeshed in the complexity of nuclear weapons issues on the government side of the table. It is abundantly clear (to me) that formulating a new nuclear weapons policy for the start of the 21st Century will be a most difficult undertaking. While the often over-simplified picture of deterrence during the Cold War—two behemoths armed to the teeth, staring each other down—has thankfully retreated into history, there are nevertheless huge arsenals of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, all in quite usable states, that could be brought back quickly to their Cold War postures. Additionally, throughout the Cold War and ever since, there has been a steady proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by other nations around the globe. The vast majority of these newly armed states are not U.S. allies, and some already are exhibiting hostile behaviors, while others have the potential to become aggressors toward the U.S., our allies, and our international interests. Russia has already begun to emphasize the importance of its arsenal of nuclear weapons to compensate for its limited conventional capabilities to deal with hostilities that appear to be increasing along its borders. It seems inescapable that the U.S. must carefully think through how we should be preparing to deal with new threats from other corners of the world, including the role that nuclear weapons might serve in deterring these threats from ever reaching actual aggressions. I personally see the abolition of nuclear weapons as an impractical dream in any foreseeable future. I came to this view from several directions. The first is the impossibility of ever “uninventing” or erasing from the human mind the knowledge of how to build such weapons. While the sudden appearance of a few tens of nuclear weapons causes only a small stir in a world where several thousands of such weapons already exist, their appearance in a world without nuclear weapons would produce huge effects. (The impact of the first two weapons in ending World War II should be a sufficient example.) I believe that the words of Winston Churchill, as quoted by Margaret Thatcher to a special joint session of the U.S. Congress on February 20, 1985, remain convincing on this point: “Be careful above all things not to let go of the atomic weapon until you are sure, and more sure than sure, that other means of preserving the peace are in your hands.” Similarly, it is my sincere view that the majority of the nations who have now acquired arsenals of nuclear weapons believe them to be such potent tools for deterring conflicts that they would **never surrender them**. Against this backdrop, I recently began to worry that because there were few public statements by U.S. officials in reaffirming the unique role which nuclear weapons play in ensuring U.S. and world security, far too many people (including many in our own armed forces) were beginning to believe that perhaps nuclear weapons no longer had value. It seemed to me that it was time for someone to step forward and articulate the other side of these issues for the public: first, that nuclear weapons remain of vital importance to the security of the U.S. and to our allies and friends (today and for the near future); and second, that nuclear weapons will likely have an enduring role in preserving the peace and preventing **world wars** for the foreseeable future. These are my purposes in writing this paper. For the past eight years, I have served several Commanders-in-Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command by chairing the Policy Subcommittee of the Strategic Advisory Group (SAG). This group was asked to help develop a new terms of reference for nuclear strategy in the post-Cold War world. This paper draws on many of the discussions with my SAG colleagues (although one must not assume their endorsement of all of the ideas presented here). We addressed how nuclear deterrence might be extended—not just to deter Russia—but how it might serve a continuing role in deterring wider acts of aggression from any corner of the world, including deterring the use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. [Taken together, these are normally referred to as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).] My approach here will be to: (1) examine what might be the appropriate roles for nuclear weapons for the future, (2) propose some new approaches to developing nuclear strategies and policies that are more appropriate for the post-Cold War world, and (3) consider the kinds of military systems and nuclear weapons that would be needed to match those policies. The Role(s) of Nuclear Weapons The Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Command, Admiral Rich Mies, succinctly reflected the current U.S. deterrent policy last year in testimony to the U.S. Senate: “Deterrence of aggression is a cornerstone of our national security strategy, and strategic nuclear forces serve as the most visible and most important element of our commitment Š (further) deterrence of major military attack on the United States and its allies, particularly attacks involving **weapons of mass destruction**, remains our highest defense priority.” While the application of this policy seemed clear, perhaps we could have said even “straightforward,” during the Cold War; application of that policy becomes even more complicated if we consider applying it to any nation other than Russia. Let me first stress that nuclear arms must never be thought of as a single “cure-all” for security concerns. For the past 20 years, only 10 percent of the U.S. defense budget has been spent on nuclear forces. The other 90 percent is for “war fighting” capabilities. Indeed, conflicts have continued to break out every few years in various regions of the globe, and these nonnuclear capabilities have been regularly employed. By contrast, we have not used nuclear weapons in conflict since World War II. This is an important distinction for us to emphasize as an element of U.S. defense policy, and one not well understood by the public at large. Nuclear weapons must never be considered as war fighting tools. Rather we should rely on the catastrophic nature of nuclear weapons to achieve war prevention, to prevent a conflict from **escalating** (e.g., **to the use of weapons of mass destruction**), or to help achieve war termination when it cannot be achieved by other means, e.g., if the enemy has already escalated the conflict through the use of weapons of mass destruction. Conventional armaments and forces will remain the backbone of U.S. defense forces, but **the inherent threat to escalate to nuclear use can help to prevent conflicts from ever starting, can prevent their escalation, as well as bring these conflicts to a swift and certain end**. In contrast to the situation facing Russia, I believe we cannot place an over-reliance on nuclear weapons, but that we must maintain adequate conventional capabilities to manage regional conflicts in any part of the world. Noting that the U.S. has always considered nuclear weapons as “weapons of last resort,” we need to give constant attention to improving conventional munitions in order to raise the threshold for which we would ever consider nuclear use. It is just as important for our policy makers to understand these interfaces as it is for our commanders. Defenses Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to strictly consider “defensive” tactics and armaments, I believe it is important for the United States to consider a continuum of defensive capabilities, from boost phase intercept to terminal defenses. Defenses have always been an important element of war fighting, and are likely to be so when defending against missiles. Defenses will also provide value in deterring conflicts or limiting escalations. Moreover, the existence of a credible defense to blunt attacks by armaments emanating from a rogue state could well eliminate that rogue nation’s ability to dissuade the U.S. from taking military actions. If any attack against the U.S., its allies, or its forces should be undertaken with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, there should be no doubt in the attacker’s mind that the United States might retaliate for such an attack with nuclear weapons; but the choice would be in our hands.

#### Deterrence between powers work – communication and nuclear learning are increasing – just a question of U.S. technical capability to maintain deterrence

Delpech ’12 – former head of strategic studies at France’s Atomic Energy Commission

(Thérèse, expert on nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation, foreign affairs analyst, “Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy”, RAND Corporation, 2012, Accessed 2-26-2013, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1103.pdf>, pg 159-161)

In 1956, Paul Nitze made an interesting analogy between a nuclear world and a chessboard.1 He wrote that even though the atomic queens may never be brought into play, their position may still have a decisive bearing on which side can safely advance a limited-war bishop or a Cold War pawn. More than 50 years later, this may still be true. But while he had in mind mainly U.S. and Soviet atomic queens, with an advantage on the American side, the reality in the 21st century may be essentially about the **shadow of America’s adversaries’ atomic [weapons]** queens. In the United States, expenditures related to the nuclear enterprise are under increasing scrutiny, making it difficult to modernize the nuclear arsenal.2 Today’s entire Air Force bomber fleet—nuclear and nonnuclear—is 90 percent smaller than it was in 1959, a decline justified in great part first by the deployment of ICBMs, the advent of precision-guided munitions, and the rise in the per-unit cost of combat aircraft, and second by the end of the Cold War. Still, all the remaining bombers are in need of costly upgrades, since the air-launched leg is apparently going to be retained for the foreseeable future.3 The remaining ICBMs are also aging rapidly, with underground silos in need of cost-prohibitive replacement. Among U.S. nuclear allies, the United Kingdom is far from having a clear nuclear policy for both political and financial reasons (in April 2011, for example, part of the UK coalition—LibDem—questioned the need for continuous submarine patrols at sea). Meanwhile in China, where the military budget has been unconstrained for 20 years, nuclear weapons are playing an increasing role. New air, sea, and ground systems are beginning to be deployed there, with great opacity denounced in the region and beyond. The future nuclear force that China has in mind is unknown. Even the number of new ICBMs, dual-capable aircraft, and nuclear submarines is anyone’s guess, though it is probable that the JL-2 will be made capable of carrying three warheads instead of one. At the same time, Beijing is developing space and cyberspace capabilities and testing them in disturbing ways. With significantly fewer financial resources than China, Russia also gives priority to its nuclear holdings because of perceived large conventional imbalances with both NATO and China. The New Start treaty has not led to any reductions in Russia, because its current holdings are already below the ceilings. In South Asia, Pakistan may well be the main strategic beneficiary of the 1998 nuclear tests, since Islamabad’s needs are much more limited than those of New Delhi. When American troops leave Afghanistan, China will have more freedom of maneuver to achieve its overriding regional objective: keeping India down. This has always been the basic tenet of the Sino-Pakistani relationship. Finally, the likelihood of additional nuclear players in the Middle East and in East Asia 20 years from now can hardly be discarded. Some official statements have now been made public. All of these factors will play a role in constraining the United States in the safe advance of what Paul Nitze called a limited-war bishop. At the same time, nuclear deterrence has receded in American minds as well as in European capitals. More urgent business—yesterday in the Balkans and Iraq, today in Afghanistan and Libya—is focusing intellectual and operational efforts. Paradoxically, a fortunate turn of events occurred with two serious nuclear incidents in 2006 and 2007 in the United States. In August 2006, nuclear fuses were mistakenly shipped to Taiwan, and a year later, in August 2007, six air-launched missiles armed with nuclear warheads were mistakenly flown from Minot Air Force Base to Barksdale Air Force Base. Both events led to the creation of Global Strike Command and to a reexamination of the nuclear enterprise. Since the revelations concerning the probable existence of additional clandestine military activities in Iran (beyond Qom) and the advancement in Pyongyang’s enrichment program, troubling questions have surfaced concerning Western intelligence, key challenges to international verification, and export control limits. In stimulating a renaissance of thought on nuclear deterrence, this reexamination should take into account the development of thinking in potentially adversarial nations. In many parts of the world, nuclear weapons are not seen as old-fashioned. The West will **not change this perception** by reducing its nuclear arsenals. Newcomers carefully follow the nuclear debates that are developing mostly in the West. They take part in them, they react to them, they read nuclear doctrines (including NATO’s new nuclear posture), and they occasionally learn from past nuclear crises. An important lesson of the Cold War stems from the high level of professionalism exhibited by those dealing with nuclear weapons on both sides. As General Larry Welch declared at the 2010 U.S. Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium in Omaha, referring to the Western and Eastern nuclear communities, “they kept peace” in part because each side recognized the competence on the other side and respected it.4 Deterrence greatly benefited from this competence and respect. It is worth noting that during the Cold War, such competence was not recognized in Mao and the Chinese. Nikita Khrushchev worried about Mao’s recklessness and his lack of understanding in nuclear matters. Things have changed a great deal in the last 40 years, but there is no doubt in the mind of this author that Beijing remains a risk-taking partner when compared with the USSR. This factor should be taken into account in the West as it already is in the East. Improving mutual understanding among potential nuclear adversaries is an important part of deterrence. Such is the purpose of a number of current bilateral strategic dialogues. Such dialogues with Russia and China have been disappointing so far. Russia, a revisionist state unlike the Soviet Union, is essentially trying to get Western military technology and is not really interested in any substantial dialogue on the most divisive issues—for example, missile defenses, a subject on which the same line of argument is presented over and over again, whatever the systems contemplated to protect Europe and America or the technical explanations provided by Washington to reassure Moscow. China, with increasingly sophisticated and well-read experts, appears reluctant to discuss with Washington its perceived conditions for strategic stability in the 21st century, a crucial topic for deterrence in both America and Europe. Track two meetings may provide different opportunities. The strategic community is now **more internationalized** than it used to be. American, European, Russian, and—increasingly—Asian experts exchange ideas on a daily basis. These meetings improve mutual understanding on key questions: ambitions, interests, sovereignty, stability, and regional crises, as well **as prevention of escalation**. Although they are not meant to replace official bilateral or multilateral meetings, they should be able to deal with part of the “thinking crisis”: With so many questions now open, shaping the intellectual framework of things to come on nuclear matters is not a minor business, especially since the real nuclear debate could well become less about nuclear abolition and more about whether there will even be any rules at all in the nuclear future.

#### Presumption flips Aff – empirical behavior of states proves the validity of deterrence. It’s unethical to risk a failure, even if the probability is low.

John S. Foster**,** Jr., Chairman of the Board of GKN Aerospace Transparency Systems, former Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Director of Defense Research and Engineering, andKeith Payne, president of the National Institute for Public Policy department head at the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, chairman of the Policy Panel of the US Strategic Command’s Senior Advisory Group, co-chair of the Nuclear Strategy Forum, and a member of the Department of State’s International Security Advisory Board, 2007. Forum on Physics and Society, “What are Nuclear Weapons For?” http://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/2007/october/foster-payne.html

Deterrence: The value of effective deterrence did not end with the Cold War; it remains essential to national security, and nuclear weapons remain essential to effective deterrence.  By helping to prevent war and the need to use force, nuclear deterrence does not represent a disdainful “trap” as some commentators have claimed.  Nuclear weapons are an enormously valuable tool of deterrence in the contemporary strategic context and should be given up only after long and careful consideration.  As Winston Churchill observed, “Be careful above all things not to let go of the atomic weapon until you are sure and more than sure that other means of preserving peace are in your hands!”[[3]](http://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/2007/october/foster-payne.html" \l "_ftn3" \o ") Strategic nuclear weapons that can **threaten** an **adversary’s valued targets** from afar are, and are likely to remain, essential for holding particularly well-protected targets at risk for deterrence purposes.  These targets are, for all practical purposes, invulnerable to non-nuclear threats and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.  For example, during the 1991 Gulf War many hardened Iraqi facilities were destroyed but some bunkers were, “virtually invulnerable to conventional weapons.”[[4]](http://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/2007/october/foster-payne.html" \l "_ftn4" \o ")  Similarly, according to statements by Clinton Administration senior officials in 1996, the Libyan chemical weapons plant located inside a mountain near Tarhunah could be threatened with destruction only by nuclear weapons.[[5]](http://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/2007/october/foster-payne.html" \l "_ftn5" \o ")   The potential importance to effective deterrence of the U.S. capability to hold these types of targets at risk from afar is suggested by the attention and resources some adversaries devote to protecting and shielding them.  Adversaries unsurprisingly seek to protect what they value.  And, as Dr. Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense during the Carter Administration, emphasized when in office, U.S. deterrence threats should be capable of holding at risk those assets particularly valued by the adversary.  In some important cases U.S non-nuclear threats cannot do so and can promise little deterrent effect. In addition, there is no doubt that some opponents who were *not* deterrable via U.S. non-nuclear threats were in fact deterred by what they interpreted to be nuclear threats.  This deterrent effect is a matter of adversary perceptions, not our preferences: Whatever we believe about the lethality of U.S. non-nuclear weapons and what should be their deterrent effect, and whatever our hopes might be about how adversaries should think and behave, the actual behavior of past adversaries, including Khrushchev, Mao, and Saddam Hussein, has shown beyond doubt that there can be a profound difference between the deterring effects of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons.  In some cases, given the adversary’s views and the context, only nuclear deterrence works.  To assert that nuclear weapons now are unimportant is to suggest either that deterrence is no longer important, or that the future will be much more benign than the past, = and that we will not again confront such opponents armed with dangerous weapons.  There is every reason to reject both propositions.  U.S. policy with regard to nuclear weapons should not be based on optimistic hopes that so contrast with the actual past behavior of foes.  Given past experience, the burden of proof is on those who now contend that nuclear deterrence no longer is necessary to preserve the peace. The question is not whether we “want” to rely on nuclear weapons for deterrence.  It is whether we are willing to accept the risk of deterrence failure that would be introduced by our inability to threaten some adversaries’ highly-valued targets that may be essentially impervious to non-nuclear weapons and/or our inability to threaten nuclear escalation in response to a severe provocation.  The risk of deterrence failure flowing from such inabilities can not be calculated with precision.  Because multiple contemporary opponents possess nuclear and/or biological weapons, the consequences of deterrence failure could be measured in thousands to millions of U.S. and/or allied casualties.  The risk of deterrence failure following from U.S. abandonment of nuclear capabilities may be low or high depending on the opponent and context.  But even low-probability events deserve serious consideration if they have potentially severe consequences.  The **move to reliance on non-nuclear weapons to hold enemy targets at risk would carry the increased risk of deterrence failure, and the probability may not be low.**

#### A specific scenario is irrelevant – intent and capability can change quickly. We should maintain the capability of deterrence

Peter Huessy, *Washington Times*, “Keep U.S. nukes; Deterrence is job number one,” 7/21/2008, lexis

At a June 27 Washington seminar, Gen. Larry Welch, USAF (ret.), former chief of staff and commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command, warned about the all-too-complacent attitude we have toward nuclear weapons and maintaining deterrence. Gen. Welch criticized the erroneous view that going to zero nuclear weapons on our part will somehow ease the strains of nuclear proliferation by Iran and North Korea: "Too many believe that U.S. security can be strengthened by letting our nuclear weapons capabilities wither away." Gen. Welch noted that believing that "the danger of proliferation and counterproliferation trumps all other considerations" results in a view that "we don't need a nuclear deterrent at this moment." But whatever surface appeal this has is washed away by hard reality. The capability to destroy the United States exists in the inventory of nuclear weapons in Russia, as during the Cold War. And the motivation existed to destroy the United States if the attacker could get away with it. "Now today the intent does not exist. But **the capability does and the intent can change overnight**," he said. All things must stem from this inescapable logic - of the relationship between capability and intent. Gen. Welch said that before risking the elimination of nuclear deterrence, a discussion of this relationship must be held. But "I have heard none," he added. In fact, among those states or actors who aspire to attain nuclear weapons, which will give that desire up if we do? Answer: **zero**. What nation, not now seeking nuclear weapons, will do so if we sustain a reliable, safe and secure nuclear deterrent? Answer: zero. And what nation will seek to gain nuclear capabilities if it loses confidence in our nuclear-umbrella deterrent? Answer: **many**. Gen. Welch emphasized: "The purpose of a reliable, safe, and secure deterrent capability is to serve as a deterrent. A retaliatory capability is essential to a credible deterrent, but it is an enabler, not the objective. If deterrence fails, we have failed in our purpose. We need to maintain a nuclear deterrent so as not to need to use it." Thus the imperatives are reliable, safe and secure weapons and a sustainable policy that pays total attention to the nuclear enterprise. If our weapons are reliable, safe and secure, their credibility cannot be questioned and therefore we would not have to use them. These weapons are designed to be responsive and are not on "hair-trigger alert," although some have been saying our ICBMs need to be de-alerted. In fact, "ICBMs have the most positive control under all conditions - and this never changes," said Gen. Welch.

#### Deterrence is the only security logic that applies to multiple groups of people and has historically prevented war and violence.

Clark **Murdock**, Ph.D., senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008. CSIS, “The Department of Defense and the Nuclear Mission in the 21st Century,” p. 13

From a systemic perspective, nuclear deterrence suppressed the level of violence associated with major power competition: wartime fatalities consumed 2 percent of the world’s population in the 1600s and 1700s, about 1 percent in the 1800s, about 1.5 percent in World War I and 2.5 percent in World War II, but about one-tenth during the Cold War (minus the Korean War, which pushed fatalities up to 0.5 percent). A leading practitioner of the art of nuclear deterrence, Sir Michael Quinlan, aptly observed: “**Better a world with nuclear weapons but no major war, than one with major war but no nuclear weapons.**”17 Despite the close calls and the now almost inexplicable buildup of nuclear weapons by the superpowers, the fact remains: nuclear weapons kept the superpower competition from becoming a war. The **violence-suppressive** effect of nuclear weapons has not gone away with the end of the Cold War. Noted Cold War deterrent theorist and Nobel economics laureate Thomas Schelling told a recent World Economic Forum retreat (according to Thomas Barnett, the Pentagon’s favorite futurist) that (1) no state that has developed nuclear weapons has ever been attacked by another state and (2) no state armed with nuclear weapons has ever attacked another state similarly armed.18 With his characteristic flair, Barnett observes that the United States and the Soviet Union learned that nuclear weapons are for having and not using. Due to the equalizing threats of mutually assured destruction, these devices cannot win wars but only prevent them. The same logic has held—all these decades—for powers as diverse as the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel, with North Korea stepping up to the plate and Iran on deck. Thus we have survived the democratic bomb and the totalitarian bomb, as well as the capitalist bomb and the communist bomb. In religious terms, we have survived the Christian and atheist bombs, the Confucian and Hindu bombs and the Islamic and Jewish bombs. Somehow, despite all the “irrationalities” ascribed to each new member, **the logic of nuclear deterrence holds fast**.19

#### A stable system of deterrence prevents nuclear war – it create a stable ontological context for interaction and expectations

Lupovici 8 (Amir, Post-Doctoral Fellow Munk Centre for International Studies, Why the Cold War Practices of Deterrence are Still Prevalent: Physical Security, Ontological Security and Strategic Discourse, [http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/ papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf](http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf), AD: 9/22/10) jl

Since deterrence can become part of the actors’ identity, it is also involved in the actors’ will to achieve ontological security, securing the actors’ identity and routines. As McSweeney explains, ontological security is “the acquisition of confidence in the routines of daily life—the essential predictability of interaction through which we feel confident in knowing what is going on and that we have the practical skill to go on in this context.” These routines become part of the social structure that **enables and constrains** the **actors’ possibilities** (McSweeney, 1999: 50-1, 154-5; Wendt, 1999: 131, 229-30). Thus, through the emergence of the deterrence norm and the construction of deterrence identities, the actors create an intersubjective context and intersubjective understandings that in turn affect their interests and routines. In this context, deterrence strategy and deterrence practices are better understood by the actors, and therefore the continuous avoidance of violence is more easily achieved. Furthermore, within such a context of deterrence relations, rationality is (re)defined, clarifying the appropriate practices for a rational actor, and this, in turn, reproduces this context and the actors’ identities. Therefore, the internalization of deterrence ideas helps to explain how actors may create more cooperative practices and **break away** from the spiral of hostility that is forced and maintained by the identities that are attached to the **security dilemma**, and which lead to mutual perception of the other as an aggressive enemy. As Wendt for example suggests, in situations where states are **restrained from** using **violence**—such as MAD (mutual assured destruction)—states not only avoid violence, but “ironically, may be willing to **trust each other** enough to take on collective identity”. In such cases if actors believe that others have no desire to engulf them, then it will be easier to trust them and to identify with their own needs (Wendt, 1999: 358-9). In this respect, the norm of deterrence, the trust that is being built between the opponents, and the (mutual) constitution of their role identities may all lead to the creation of long term influences that preserve the practices of deterrence as well as the avoidance of violence. Since a basic level of trust is needed to attain ontological security,21 the existence of it may further strengthen the practices of deterrence and the actors’ identities of deterrer and deterred actors. In this respect, I argue that for the reasons mentioned earlier, the practices of deterrence should be understood as providing both physical and ontological security, thus refuting that there is necessarily tension between them. Exactly for this reason I argue that Rasmussen’s (2002: 331-2) assertion—according to which MAD was about enhancing ontological over physical security—is only partly correct. Certainly, MAD should be understood as providing ontological security; but it also allowed for physical security, since, compared to previous strategies and doctrines, it was all about decreasing the physical **threat of nuclear weapons**. Furthermore, the ability to increase one dimension of security helped to enhance the other, since it strengthened the actors’ identities and created more stable expectations of **avoiding violence**.

#### Only deterrence can provide competing nations with stable, peaceful identities – this de-escalates all violence and creates a global norm against hostility

Lupovici 8 (Amir, Post-Doctoral Fellow Munk Centre for International Studies, Why the Cold War Practices of Deterrence are Still Prevalent: Physical Security, Ontological Security and Strategic Discourse, [http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/ papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf](http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf), AD: 9/22/10) jl

I suggest that deterrence norm not only regulates actors’ behavior but constitutes their (role) identities.18 According to Wendt, role identities exist only in relation to “Others.” One can have a specific role identity “only by occupying a position in a social sturcture and following behavioral norms towards Others possessing relevant counteridentities” (Wendt, 1999: 227, italics in orginal; see also Lipschutz, 1995: 217). In this respect, role identity cannot be chosen but is learnt and forced by interactions with significant others. Over time, such interactions construct a structure of roles, meaning, and rules that allow actors to know how to continue acting (Fierke, 2000: 339; Wendt, 1999: 226-9, 327; see also Wegner, 1998: 154-5; Milliken, 2001: 18-9). Thus, identities create the context and the discourse that the actors use, and at the same time those identities are constrained, shaped, and empowered by these social structures (see Hopf, 2002: 1, 13; Hansen, 2006: 44). In this respect, I suggest that deterrence relations depend not only on how actors understand each other, but on how they understand each other’s roles and on the existence of counter identities (deterrent/ deterred). Such identities create a context in which actors have better tools to interpret their opponent’s aims and to provide a suitable response. In such situations, threats posed to preserve deterrence can be more **easily interpreted** as **attempts to deter rather than to escalate.** Similarly, reassurance steps will be interpreted as attempts to draw the lines of deterrence rather than to appease.19 It is useful to acknowledge both the constitutive effects of deterrence ideas and the fact that deterrence is part of the actors’ role identities. This provides an interesting angle from which to study how domestic politics influence the practices of deterrence, how domestic politics in one state influence another state, and how social, cultural, and political factors shape the way that deterrence is manifested in different states.20 Furthermore, it should also be acknowledged that the constitutive influences of deterrence strategy may be negative. Because deterrence role identity becomes embedded in political discourse, it can become a tool in political rhetoric and can be used to justify, burden, or even prevent political moves. For example, the Israeli tendency to assume that if Israel practices deterrence, deterrence will work (e.g., see Almog, 2004-5) can be explained by the concept of deterrence identity. This concept can thus explain the prominence of deterrence rhetoric in Israel, a rhetoric that aimed, for example, to justify the Israeli presence in Lebanon during the 1990s (“withdrawal would erode the deterrent posture”) (see in Kaye, 2002-3: 569) and the need to retaliate after the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers in August 2006 to strengthen the Israeli deterrent posture (see Lupovici, 2008). 3.4 Deterrence Norm and Ontological Security.

#### You must weigh the consequences of any action that affects deterrence.

Keith Payne, president of the National Institute for Public Policy department head at the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, chairman of the Policy Panel of the US Strategic Command’s Senior Advisory Group, co-chair of the Nuclear Strategy Forum, and a member of the Department of State’s International Security Advisory Board, 2009. Strategic Studies Quarterly, “On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance.”

A common problem with recent and past nuclear disarmament initiatives is that they emphasize the risks of maintaining US nuclear capabilities, but are silent or wholly superficial in discussing the risks of their elimination. The postulated benefit from US moves toward giving up nuclear capabilities typically is presented in terms of the contribution such a move supposedly would make to the goal of nuclear nonproliferation. 60 US steps toward global nuclear disarmament supposedly will begin the action-reaction process of eliminating those nuclear threats that justify retaining US nuclear weapons for deterrence: no such threat, no such need. As I have argued elsewhere, the traditional balance-of-terror’s simplistic action-reaction process is utterly inadequate for contemporary strategic conditions. Whatever the merit of that metaphor for this application, however, the question of nuclear disarmament must include a net assessment—a review of the value of nuclear weapons and the related downside of losing that value.

#### Subjective violence should precede systemic violence in your calculus

Linden ’12

(Harry van der, Butler University, “On the Violence of Systemic Violence: A Critique of Slavoj Zizek”, 1-1-2012, http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1249&context=facsch\_papers&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Dstructural%2520violence%2520coady%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D6%26ved%3D0CEUQFjAF%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fdigitalcommons.butler.edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1249%2526context%253Dfacsch\_papers%26ei%3D445nUNPLGon49QTQpoHIBA%26usg%3DAFQjCNHAtwi4GF88kWuuxN3ymbIA8Y3Ggw#search=%22structural%20violence%20coady%22)

The “force” at the endpoint of the process of subjective violence, however, stays in place whether the violence is technologically mediated or not, and this force leads to a much more narrow range of harms inflicted by subjective violence than is caused by systemic violence. The harms of subjective violence are death, bodily harms, and acute psychological malfunctioning caused by “force,” while social injustice or systemic violence leads to such a wide variety of harms as social and political exclusion, inadequate intellectual development due to insufficient educational opportunities, harsh working conditions, subsistent wages, lack of free time and recreational opportunities, inadequate housing or no housing at all, lack of basic medical care, hunger, and inadequate access to clean water. We have noted that the degree of permitted counter-violence should vary with the seriousness of the violent threat and the culpability of the perpetrator, and that from this perspective much counter-violence in our society is disproportionate or excessive. Some of the harms of systemic violence (e.g., restricted educational opportunities) are such that revolutionary violence as counter-violence would be disproportionate, especially since revolutionary violence may easily escalate and inevitably include seriously harming people with limited moral responsibility. Other harms caused by poor institutions, though, such as serious illness, starvation, or a much-reduced lifespan, are such that they meet the bar set by proportionality. What should be taken into account in making such proportionality judgments is that subjective violence tends to have a different psychological impact on its victims than systemic violence, even when their respective harms are otherwise equally bad or even similar in kind. Only subjective violence tends to come suddenly to its victims, often leaving them in fear, shock, paralysis, and helplessness. What adds to their trauma is the very realization that another human being is intent on physically harming or killing them, disrupting the everyday trust in minimal human decency and cooperation. So, for example, even a preventable industrial accident that occurs due to infrequent safety inspections as an instance of systemic violence will have a different psychological impact on a mining community than a brutal attack by the mine owner’s private army against a peaceful protest of his workers in support of greater mine safety. Much systemic violence can be integrated into everyday life, but the same is much more difficult to do with regard to most subjective violence. It is this very fact that makes oppressive political violence so often effective in the short run. But, again, the differences here between subjective and systemic violence are less pronounced when subjective violence becomes impersonally or “bureaucratically” executed, as, for example, in penal violence (what happens during an execution provides a good illustration) and strategic bombing (assuming that the bombing campaigns remain limited in scope and frequency). This brings me to the most crucial distinction – for my purpose here – between systemic and subjective violence: the range of options available to the victims in addressing the former are much greater than for the latter. Once the clubs come down or the bullets fly in political protest, the choice is to flee and capitulate, fight back, or hope that nonviolent sacrifice will cease the violence. Similarly, once a war of aggression is under way the basic choice is to fight back or surrender and then hope that a massacre will not follow. Surrender does not preclude nonviolent resistance to the aggressor, but it means at least that the aggressor has been initially successful in imposing his political will. In cases of political violence, the intention of the perpetrator is typically to impose his political will, restricting the options of the victims by making resistance to this will very costly. Personal violence might not have such coercive intent, but similar limited action options are in place. Basically, once an individual attacks you personally, the choice is to fight back or hope that the cheek is not hit too hard when it is turned. In my view, fighting back, or counter-violence, is a prima facie right, but to make its actual execution morally right presumes that other moral standards are satisfied, such as proportionality in the case of individual counter-violence and jus ad bellum and jus in bello standards (or approximations thereof) in the case of collective violence. The mere fact of systemic violence, to the contrary, does not warrant counter-violence; for social injustice can be effectively addressed in many different ways, including through institutional reforms from within, nonviolent protests, boycotts, collective strikes, lobbying, and electoral action. Even when social injustice can only be addressed through revolutionary change, counter-violence is not prima-facie warranted because it might be disproportionate. More importantly, it might not be necessary because it has become abundantly clear during the past few decades that nonviolence strategies can be remarkably successful in overthrowing oppressive regimes and the recent emergence of the global public sphere will only increase the chance of success of future endeavors. However, once the struggle for social justice is met by widespread violence inflicted, or supported, by the state, revolutionary counter-violence is prima facie morally right. Broadly speaking, the ethics of self-defense retains its moral force in light of the fact that nonviolence has not proven to be effective against agents who have no qualms unleashing subjective violence. No doubt, these are all difficult moral issues that should be carefully discussed and placed within their historical context. But all too often this does not happen in Žižek’s work, especially in Violence, and what we find instead is the claim that systemic violence rightfully begets subjective violence because it projects violence. This claim has only a ring of plausibility when we neglect that the two types of violence in this equation create very different ranges of options for remedial action. A more critical use of the concept of violence would not enable him to offer such a broad and facile justification of revolutionary violence. To avoid misunderstanding, I am not claiming that the notion of systemic violence necessarily leads to a broad and superficial justification of revolutionary violence. Galtung, for example, does not make such an inference. However, one must then ask why the inference is not appropriate since it is commonly accepted that counter-violence against wrongful violence is justified. This means that one must show how systemic violence differs from subjective violence so that counter-violence is generally only prima facie just with regard to the latter. I 18 suspect that once such differences are articulated (as I have tried to do in this paper) the notion of systemic violence loses much of its credibility. At any rate, the proponent of the notion of systemic violence should at least caution or clarify that our typical emotive and moral responses to subjective violence might not apply to systemic violence. The proponent also should outline some convincing limits on extending the core concept of violence because without such limits, as will become clear in the next section, we might end up with more conceptual and practical confusion and questionable support of revolutionary violence.

#### Quantitative studies and a variety of methodological tests verify the theory of nuclear deterrence

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(Rauchhaus, Robert. “Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2/5/09 jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/53/2/258>)

In recent years, neo-liberal explanations of the Long Peace have received the most rigorous empirical scrutiny. 7 Realist explanations including the distribution of power, system polarity, and alliance systems have also received considerable attention. 8 Surprisingly, the nuclear peace hypothesis—one of the central tenants of realist explanations for the Long Peace— has received relatively little quantitative scrutiny. Scholars have employed case studies, counterfactual analysis, and formalized their arguments with game theory, but, with the exception of this issue (Gartzke and Jo, Horowitz, Beardsley and Asal, This issue), only a handful of studies have attempted to quantitatively evaluate the effects of nuclear weapons (Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 1982; Geller 1990; Asal and Beardsley 2007). Moreover, previous quantitative studies have exclusively focused on the relationship between nuclear weapons and crises, or between nuclear weapons and dispute escalation. The relationship between nuclear weapons and the probability of war remains quantitatively untested. The central purpose of this paper is to offer an empirical answer to the question: do nuclear weapons reduce the probability of war? To answer this question, this project borrows 3 heavily from the last 15 years of work on democratic peace theory (DPT). Beginning with Maoz and Russett (1993), the dyadic DPT research design has been reproduced in dozens of articles and survived peer review in nearly every leading journal of political science and international relations. Building on Pevehouse and Russett (2006) and using the same key “control” variables, this study incorporates new data that allow for the quantitative evaluation of the nuclear peace hypothesis. The results presented below indicate that the impact of nuclear weapons is more complicated than is conventionally appreciated. Both proliferation optimists (Waltz 1981) and proliferation pessimists (Sagan 1994) find confirmation of some of their key claims. As proliferation optimists contend, when two states possess nuclear weapons, the odds of war drop precipitously. However, in most other respects, proliferation pessimists find vindication of their position. In disputes where only one of two parties posses nuclear weapons, there is an increased chance of war. Moreover, nuclear weapons are generally associated higher likelihoods of crises, uses of force, and conflicts involving lower-levels of casualties. The findings of this article are consistent with the larger themes of the special issue, demonstrating that nuclear possession can enhance the security of their possessors by shifting conflict to the lower end of the intensity spectrum.

#### These studies show the basic assumption of nuclear deterrence is correct

**Rauchhaus 09**

(Rauchhaus, Robert. “Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2/5/09 jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/53/2/258>)

Although the Cold War was often fierce, especially in the developing world where it frequently played out, it never managed to escalate to World War III. Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, this has prompted some to argue that Cold War is better thought of as the “Long Peace” (Gaddis 1986; Gaddis 1987; Kegley 1991).1 Despite the worries of some, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolarity has not, or at least has not yet, undermined the Long Peace. At present, **we remain in the longest period of great power peace since the advent of the modern state system**. Despite the mutation of violence into other forms, we can point to World War II as a watershed event that was followed by a sixty year decline in battle deaths from interstate war (Human Security Report 2005; Lacina, Gleditsch, and Russett 2006).2 What is responsible for the Long Peace over the last six decades? The three main approaches to international relations (IR) have each offered answers to this question.3 The most widely cited explanation is that of neo-liberals. Building on Kant’s Perpetual Peace (1795), modern liberals point to democracy (Maoz and Russett 1993), trade (Keohane and Nye 1977), and international organizations (Keohane 1984) as key causes of peace. As a related approach, constructivism also views democracy, trade, and international organizations as important factors, but it parts company with neo-liberalism by attributing the root cause of the Long Peace to evolving norms and the social construction of identity (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1992; Wendt 1999).4 Neo-realism, in contrast, is fundamentally at odds with both approaches and rejects the importance of the Kantian Tripod and evolving norms. Instead, the Long Peace is generally attributed to absence of multi-polarity and the presence of nuclear weapons (Waltz 1979; Waltz 1990). 5 In recent years, neo-liberal explanations of the Long Peace have received the most rigorous empirical scrutiny.6 Realist explanations including the distribution of power, system polarity, and alliance systems have also received considerable attention.7 Surprisingly, the nuclear peace hypothesis—one of the central tenants of realist explanations for the Long Peace— has received relatively little quantitative scrutiny. Scholars have employed case studies, counter- factual analysis, and formalized their arguments with game theory, but to date Geller (1990) and Aral and Beardsley (2007) remain two of the only studies to quantitatively evaluate the effects of nuclear weapons. Although both of these studies make important contributions to our understanding of nuclear deterrence, more work needs to be done. The central purpose of this paper is to offer an empirical answer to the question: do nuclear weapons reduce the probability of war? To answer this question, this project borrows heavily from the last 15 years of work on the democratic peace. Building on the dataset and research design by Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum (2003), this paper quantitatively evaluates the nuclear peace hypothesis. Dyad year data from the full population of cases from the 1885-1992 period is modified to include information on nuclear states. The results presented below indicate that the impact of nuclear weapons is more complicated than is conventionally appreciated. Both proliferation optimists (Waltz 1981) and pessimists (Sagan 1994) will find confirmation of some of their key claims. **When a nuclear asymmetry exists between two states, there is a greater chance of militarized disputes and war. In contrast, when there is symmetry and both states possess nuclear weapons, then the odds of war precipitously drop**.

#### Deterrence is ethical—it forces responsibility and is fundamentally a defensive posture

Colby ‘7

(Elbridge. IOrbis v. 51 no3 Summer 2007)

In between these two extremes, deterrence is a security policy that offers a way forward for the United States that is not only more effective because more tailored, but is also more moral. It is more moral because a deterrent posture would entail a strategy that is more proportionate, more necessary, more responsive, and, ultimately, more just. Indeed, deterrence comports with the fundamental human intuition that it is generally only moral to ﬁght when attacked. In this it complies with the classical conception of just war, which mandates that wars only be conducted when one’s cause is just, waged by a legitimate authority, motivated by a right intent, fought with a real prospect of success, conducted proportionately, and undertaken only as a last resort. Deterrence satisﬁes these criteria. It is a defensive strategy that responds to invasions or attacks, and is therefore just; it sets out relatively clear guide-lines for when it mandates that the government ﬁght, and, therefore, is governed by legitimate authority. It is driven by a desire to protect, deter, and avenge, and is therefore motivated by right intent; its realistic red lines and threats are backed up by the awesome power of the United States, and therefore likely to succeed; and it responds when attacked and asks from the rest of the international community only respect for its marked out positions rather than revolutionary transformation, and is therefore proportional.22 Finally, by its nature it is undertaken as a last resort rather than preventively.23 It was the fundamental moral attractiveness of this position that continually frustrated both Soviet efforts to decouple Europe from the American nuclear umbrella during the Cold War and occasional American efforts to roll back the Soviet empire. **But theorizing about war and peace cannot remain at the level of abstraction. It must bear moral responsibility for actual consequence and the power of contingency,** as Max Weber pointed out.24 And deterrence, defense by calculation, uniquely satisﬁes the moral requirement that leaders, whatever their benevolent intentions, are basically responsible for the consequences that contingency produces from their actions. This it does by grounding a nation’s security on its own credible threats—not on either changing the world through force, as neo-conservatives advocate, nor by hoping that a more peaceful world will emerge, as the left proposes. Both of these extremes ground security on radical changes in the way the world operates, and, therefore, necessarily enmesh us in the rest of the world’s affairs, thereby exponentially expanding our vulnerability to all the permutations that chance and contingency may produce. Deterrence, rather, narrows our proﬁle, and thereby reduces our exposure to risk.

#### And, ethical or psychological flaws don’t deny the truth of deterrence

**Rauchhaus 09**

(Rauchhaus, Robert. “Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2/5/09 jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/53/2/258>)

Scholars who are critical of nuclear deterrence have generally avoided questioning whether nuclear weapons make war less likely. Instead, they usually take one of two approaches. “Safety critics” warn that the nuclear weapons pose a danger because of accidental detonations and inadvertent escalation (Sagan 1993). In contrast, “moral critics” argue that nuclear weapons should be eliminated because they violate international law, are immoral, or both (Falk and Lifton 1991). Oddly enough, **neither** safety critics nor moral critics **tend to question whether nuclear weapons deter war.** To the contrary, some critics have assumed that nuclear weapons do indeed reduce the chance of conflict, but argue instead that their deterrent value is outweighed by safety concerns and the prospects of more proliferation (Sagan 1994). The theoretical underpinnings of nuclear deterrence have received considerable treatment over the years. Using game theory and other formal methods, scholars have examined crisis stability, various deterrent strategies, the credibility of threats, and the consequences of proliferation (Berkowitz 1985; Brito and Intriligator 1996; Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 1982; Harvey and James 1996; Intriligator and Brito 1981; Nalebuff 1988; Powell 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990; Schelling 1960, 1966; Wagner 1991). Others have scrutinized the psychological underpinnings of deterrence and the assumption of rationality (Jervis 1984; 1989; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985). Despite the potential problems associated with nuclear deterrence, **their pacifying effects are seldom challenged**.

#### We don’t need absolute certainty to conclude deterrence is good. As long as we establish some correlative relation, that’s good enough

**Welsh 03**

(Welsh, John. USAWC Strategy Research Project US army War College Publications “Nuclear Deterrence is Here to Stay” 2003, [www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTFDoc?AD=ADA414501&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTFDoc?AD=ADA414501&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf))

Deterrence is a complex concept. The word deter derives from a Latin root, deterre, that means “to frighten from” or “to turn aside, discourage, or prevent from acting.” A more modern definition comes from Webster’s dictionary which defines deterrence as: “The act or a means of deterring and measures taken by a state or an alliance of states to prevent hostile action by another state.”4 Deterrence is actually a communication process with elements of punishment and assurance. An adversary must believe that certain actions will result in unacceptable risks and losses and, conversely, that averting those actions will prevent the execution of the threats. The process of deterrence involves assessing both what is known and what is not. Capabilities to punish can be measured with good knowledge, but intentions and willingness to act or show constraint can not.5 Can we make the assumption that the fear of punishment kept us from going to war with the Soviets during the Cold War? Many believe that nuclear deterrence was in fact a major factor. When we look at the Cold War in retrospect, we find that we experienced the longest peace among major powers in the history of the world.6 **It is hard to prove that the concept of deterrence alone kept the U.S. and the Soviet Union from using nuclear weapons, but the evidence points to the fact that since their introduction, nuclear weapons and their threat of use have kept us from going the route of the dinosaurs by destroying the Earth and the exterminating the entire human race.**

#### U.S. leaders will cling to nuclear deterrence inevitably – only a question of how credible and effective it is

Thompson ’11 – Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute

(Loren, was Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and taught graduate-level courses in strategy, technology and media affairs at Georgetown. I have also taught at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, holds doctoral and masters degrees in government from Georgetown University and a bachelor of science degree in political science from Northeastern University, “Nuclear Paradox: Shrinking U.S. Arsenal Requires Huge New Expenditures”, Forbes, 6-13-2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2011/06/13/nuclear-paradox-shrinking-u-s-arsenal-requires-huge-new-expenditures/)

The anti-nuclear rhetoric coming out of the White House during Obama’s early days in office was so persistent that some senior military officers worried the new president was taking America in the direction of unilateral disarmament, even though the candidate had explicitly ruled out that possibility during the campaign. But the military need not have worried, because the way things are turning out, Barack Obama is likely to spend more money on the U.S. nuclear arsenal than any U.S. president since Ronald Reagan. In fact, if all the plans authorized on Obama’s watch come to fruition, hundreds of billions of dollars will eventually be spent on new nuclear capabilities and infrastructure by a president who has repeatedly endorsed the goal of a nuclear-free world. This may be the ultimate example of how gaining political power can **transform the beliefs of leaders** — not because Obama has abandoned his support of disarmament, but because of how being responsible for the nation’s security forces him to think in practical terms about the dangers of disarming. To understand the seeming divergence between the president’s convictions and his military plans, you have to grasp the perverse logic of U.S. nuclear strategy. U.S. military analysts figured out during the early days of the Cold War that no effective defense against a large-scale nuclear attack was likely to be feasible. The Russians were acquiring thousands of warheads, and the destructive potential of each one was so great that if even a small fraction managed to penetrate U.S. defenses, the nation would probably be wiped out. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara illustrated the problem in congressional testimony when he displayed a graph that indicated how destruction in the Soviet Union would level off after a relatively small portion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal had been expended, because there wasn’t much left to destroy. With both nations facing the possibility of nuclear obliteration, a new approach to national security clearly was needed. The concept that policymakers settled on was deterrence — the idea that enemies could be dissuaded from aggression by threatening horrible consequences. The key to effective nuclear deterrence was a secure retaliatory capability, meaning an arsenal that could ride out any surprise attack and then respond with such devastating effect that adversaries would find the prospect unacceptable. As long as enemies were not crazy or accident prone, the thinking went, a secure retaliatory force should be sufficient to deter nuclear attack. U.S. military planners spent the next 50 years revising and refining the requirements of deterrence, spelling out in great detail the performance characteristics required of U.S. nuclear forces to assure they were both survivable and credible. Survivability resulted mainly from having a trio (or “triad”) of well-protected nuclear systems — land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles and manned bombers — that were so different no enemy could conceivably destroy them all in a surprise attack. **Credibility**, which was crucial in a strategy based mainly on **influencing enemy psychology**, meant having targeting options that were believable and proportional to any provocation. The United States eventually ended up with over 30,000 warheads in its arsenal before the two superpowers accepted the impossibility of achieving meaningful superiority in a world of “mutual assured destruction.” Once that realization occurred, though, a gradual reduction in forces commenced that accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By the time President Obama took office, there were only about 5,000 warheads in the active strategic arsenal, and nobody talked much anymore about the danger of nuclear war. In fact, Obama’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review displaced traditional deterrence objectives from the top of the strategic agenda, emphasizing instead the importance of halting nuclear proliferation and preventing nuclear terrorism. But the need for **nuclear deterrence still existed**, because **Russia retained thousands of warheads** and **China had at least hundreds**. In addition, new nuclear powers such as North Korea and Pakistan were emerging. It was the enduring need for deterrence that forced the Obama Administration to confront a paradox of nuclear strategy. The paradox is that the fewer weapons each side has the greater the danger of a surprise attack because at lower numbers it becomes easier for each country to disarm the other side. For instance, when the United States had hundreds of nuclear-capable bombers scattered around the world, there wasn’t much danger Russia could catch them all on the ground in a first strike. But now that there are only sixty located at a handful of sites, an enemy might be able to take out a sizable portion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal with a dozen well-placed warheads. The other part of the paradox is that if the enemy really thinks it can pull off a disarming surprise attack, then the very fact we have a retaliatory force is a powerful inducement to launching that attack — because what looks like a deterrent to us looks like a huge threat to them. After all, it is aimed at their cities, their factories, and their own retaliatory capabilities. So ironically, as the size of the U.S. strategic arsenal shrinks, the government needs to spend huge amounts making sure what’s left is still an effective deterrent. And unfortunately for President Obama, the arsenal he inherited hadn’t seen much in the way of modernization since the Cold War ended. The biggest part of the Obama nuclear buildup, if you’ll pardon the expression, is efforts to replace or improve all three types of launching systems in the current strategic arsenal. A fleet of 14 Trident ballistic missile submarines due to start retiring in 2027 will be replaced by 12 follow-on subs that will probably cost around $80 billion to design and build and hundreds of billions more to operate over their 40-year service lives. The president’s fiscal 2012 budget request includes a billion dollars to continue design work on the new class of subs. The 60 B-52 and B-2 bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons must be upgraded in the near term and replaced over the long term; the Obama plan calls for spending $1 billion over the next five years on upgrading 16 nuclear-capable B-2s and $4 billion on developing a bomber that might one day replace it in the nuclear strike mission. And the 450 silo-based Minuteman missiles located in Montana, North Dakota and Wyoming will require additional life-extension measures to assure their survivability and reliability beyond 2030. Those are the nuclear-weapons expenditures most visible to the outside world, but there are a host of other outlays that will be required to keep the nation’s strategic posture viable. For instance, the administration noted when it released the Nuclear Posture Review that there would be a need to “make new investments in the U.S. command and control system to maximize presidential decision time in a nuclear crisis.” What this means is that communications links between commanders and nuclear forces must be strengthened so that the potential loss of control in a nuclear scenario does not force a launch decision before critical details about threats are in hand. The need to acquire as much information as possible before acting in a crisis situation also explains why the United States is currently orbiting a new generation of space-based infrared satellites that can detect missile launches and nuclear detonations within seconds after they occur. And then there is the nuclear complex where warhead components are manufactured, refurbished and dismantled. You wouldn’t think much spending is required to sustain a complex that hasn’t produced a single new warhead since 1991, but the system consumes a billion dollars per month and that figure is going up. In the absence of new production, old weapons must be **repaired and upgraded**, often using nuclear material recovered from weapons that are being retired. The retired weapons must be taken apart and their pieces re-used or rendered safe, an extremely complex procedure. The need to sustain such processes has led to major new construction projects at all of the industrial sites involved in nuclear weapons work. For example, a 350,000 square-foot uranium processing facility will be built at the Y-12 plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and three different facilities will be built at the Savannah River plant in South Carolina to dispose of weapons-grade plutonium. Thus, the Obama nuclear plan will generate huge revenues for companies involved in nuclear work such as Babcock & Wilcox and General Dynamics, the probable builder of the submarine that replaces Trident. However, it isn’t likely that President Obama and his security team envisioned the full extent of budgetary outlays that would be required to sustain the nation’s nuclear forces as they drove toward the goal of a nuclear-free world. As things currently stand, the administration will be spending a good deal more money on nuclear weapons during Obama’s tenure than renewable energy, a prospect that can’t be pleasing to progressives. On the other hand, nuclear war remains by far the greatest military threat that the nation faces. Not only would it generate more destruction than any other form of conflict, but our methods for preventing it are weaker, relying mainly on psychology rather than tangible defenses. As the number of nuclear weapons declines it may become more feasible to build defenses that can stop an attack, but for the time being conservatives and liberals alike are stuck with the paradoxes of surviving in the nuclear age. In President Obama’s case, that means spending a great deal of money on items you wish didn’t exist at all.

#### Spaces like this debate are critical to confirm public confidence in nuclear deterrence and prevent nuclear war

Delpech ’12 – former head of strategic studies at France’s Atomic Energy Commission

(Thérèse, expert on nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation, foreign affairs analyst, “Nuclear ¶ Deterrence ¶ in the 21st ¶ Century¶ Lessons from the Cold War ¶ for a New Era of Strategic Piracy”, RAND Corporation, 2012, Accessed 2-26-2013, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1103.pdf>, ¶ pg 9-11)

One of its most important tasks is to keep humanity within the boundaries of acceptable historical experiences. 3 Sixty-seven years after 1945, most would consider a nuclear attack to be beyond those boundaries. The variety of nuclear actors, the proliferation of cruise and ballistic missiles, thermonuclear weapons, and radical ideologies have transformed the nuclear scene to a considerable extent since the end of World War II. Whether thinking on nuclear weapons has followed a similarly impressive path, particularly since the dissolution of the USSR, is questionable. There are numerous analyses and studies, but they do not match the quality and pertinence of those of the Cold War vintage. While nuclear deterrence attracted an abundance of intellectual attention during the Cold War, since the 1950s there has been a decline in thinking on this subject even as the risk of nuclear use has been rising. The absolute necessity of preventing extreme violence among states (as opposed to nonstate actors) has receded in our minds, even though it is prominent in our speeches. Humanity does not learn much from events that do not happen. In a way, the very success of the deterrence enterprise during the Cold War undermined its principal gain: Since no nuclear exchange took place, the notion of nuclear weapons as a threat to our survival lost a good deal of force and a sense of urgency. Ideas have consequences. So does a lack of them. During the Cold War, a mixture of deterrence, containment, conventional capabilities, and arms control seemed successful in preventing a nuclear exchange with the Soviets. Luck may have played a part as well. 4 Today’s nuclear dangers seem to pale in comparison with those of the Cold War. They pale even when compared with those of the 1990s, when Russia was weak, with a considerable and poorly guarded nuclear stockpile and nuclear scientists and military officials reduced to poverty. At the time, a substantial effort was launched to secure Russia’s weapons, nuclear materials, and scientists. New problems are arising now: nuclear terrorism; radical Islamists challenging the Islamabad government; the ability of nonstate actors to bring India and Pakistan to the brink of war; asymmetric nuclear threats coming from Iran and North Korea; 5 Pakistan’s, Iran’s, and North Korea’s nuclear and missile proliferation nexus; and China increasingly asserting its military achievements—including its nuclear, ballistic missile, cyber, and space achievements. 6 While many in the West tend to see nuclear weapons as instruments of the past, other actors view them as weapons of the future. There are obvious gaps in Western thinking and some disregard for those gaps. However unpleasant, it is imperative to address these. To start with, consider the following reasons why another look at nuclear deterrence is important in the 21st century. The first is obvious: In an era of extraordinary uncertainty, turmoil, and upheavals, it is good to keep a clear mind about the most dangerous strategic situations contemporary leaders may face. There is little doubt that a nuclear crisis—or, worse, a nuclear attack—whether effected by a nation-state or a nonstate actor, would be a critical situation. It should be considered unlikely, but as long as it appears even remotely possible, the difficult choices that would be required from governments ought to be understood for what they are, particularly in democratic societies. Such choices are “deeply baffling even to the ablest minds,” as Bernard and Fawn Brodie wrote in From Crossbow to H-Bomb. 7 The “unthinkable” 8 may have become less unlikely in practice since reckless actors are entering the nuclear arena, but it is becoming increasingly unlikely in Western minds at a time when even the political capacity of tolerating military casualties is questionable. Foreign policy, notably Western foreign policy, continues to be made under the shadow of a nuclear strategy that is almost forgotten or that is becoming empty. The consequence is that our ability to face a nuclear attack effectively may be slipping through our fingers. If this is true, what the strategic planning community can contribute toward preventing this loss (or preparing to deal with it, if necessary) is to revitalize nuclear thinking. This does not call for any specific doctrine but for a top-quality intellectual debate on the concepts, old and new; on the crises, old and new; and on the actors, whether they played a part on the nuclear scene in the past or are only just now entering it, sometimes with masks on their faces.

# 2AC

## Case

#### Empirics de facto prove U.S. nuclear deterrence works – hold the Neg ev to a high standard – leaders lie and correlation is enough

Culp ’12 – Research Associate at Columbia University National Center for Disaster Preparedness

(Derrin, PART I: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF¶ “THE MYTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE”, The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 51-68, 2012)

In the final sections of his paper, Wilson pulls together various strands of evidence¶ concerning the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. Taking up the argument that nuclear¶ deterrence cannot necessarily claim credit for the absence of nuclear attacks or great¶ power conflict since 1945, he enunciates a tough standard in order to claim that prize:¶ ‘‘In order to answer the question ‘did deterrence work?’ you must first be able to¶ know whether your opponent had a fully formed intention to attack and then refrained¶ from doing so because of your threat.’’¶ 58 This standard seems excessive for several¶ reasons, not the least of which is that ‘‘fully formed’’ is very much in the eye of the¶ beholder.¶ As in Wilson’s reckoning of historical wars of extermination, intent here is key.¶ He emphasizes the difficulty of discerning statesmen’s intentions, but seems of two minds¶ about the implication of this caveat. His quotation from behavioral scientist Alexander L.¶ George and political scientist Richard Smoke urges skepticism concerning evidence that¶ leaders were deterred.59 On the other hand, he says that because statesmen are reluctant¶ to admit they’ve been thwarted, one should be cautious in accepting their statements¶ that they were not; leaders may have been deterred more than they let on.60¶ Furthermore, Wilson’s threshold reflects the perspective that a firm decision to¶ attack must precede consideration of retaliatory threats; the processes of deciding to¶ attack, evaluating threats of retaliation, and deciding not to attack are sequential and¶ independent. However, these processes occur simultaneously and influence each other.¶ It would seem reasonable to conclude that nuclear deterrence had succeeded if an¶ enemy’s knowledge and perception of the deterrent threat had removed attack from¶ his menu of viable options, or substantially raised his threshold for considering attack.¶ Compared to Wilson’s standard for deterrence success, this alternative is very modest.¶ One can at least imagine the possibility of demonstrating that a deterrent threat changed¶ an enemy’s assessment or ranking of its options in this way. Bluth recently attempted to do precisely that, arguing that the threat of Western¶ retaliation with nuclear weapons (coupled with the death of Stalin) had several profound¶ effects on Soviet national policy and military doctrine.61 According to Bluth, nuclear¶ deterrent threats convinced Soviet leaders that attacking the West was tantamount to¶ national suicide and initiating the end of civilization on earth. It led them to repudiate¶ the Leninist doctrine of the ‘‘inevitably of war,’’ reject war with imperialist states as a tool¶ to advance world revolution, reconsider the strategic merits and potential of surprise¶ attack, contain conflicts at a local or sub-regional level, and make avoidance of global¶ or total war their ultimate objective.

#### Default to deterrence explanations – the Neg’s standard is too high and alternative explanations for no war are inadequate

Culp ’12 – Research Associate at Columbia University National Center for Disaster Preparedness

(Derrin, PART I: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF¶ “THE MYTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE”, The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 51-68, 2012)

Wilson repeats his ‘‘chicken and egg’’ conundrum when he notes that ‘‘there is little¶ evidence that either the United States or the Soviet Union was ever on the brink of¶ launching an aggressive war against the other’’ and asks, ‘‘How is it possible to assert¶ that deterrence prevented war without clear evidence that war was ever imminent?’’¶ 62¶ If there was not a potential great power military confrontation to be deterred, he wonders,¶ how can one credit deterrence with anything?¶ Here again, Wilson has specified a threshold for crediting nuclear deterrence\*war¶ between America and the Soviet Union was imminent\*that would be almost impossible¶ to document. However, the term ‘‘nuclear crisis’’ did not permanently enter America’s¶ national security lexicon by accident; in a handful of incidents\*Suez in 1956, Berlin in¶ 1959, Cuba in 1962, the Middle East in 1973\*US leaders acutely perceived a significantly¶ heightened risk of nuclear conflict with another nuclear state.¶ Many would agree, though, that the Cold War antagonists were not perpetually on¶ the brink of war. Even so, unlike Ohio State University’s John Mueller, in his classic¶ International Security article ‘‘The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the¶ Postwar World,’’ Wilson doesn’t advance any explanation as to why not, if not nuclear¶ deterrence.63 In fact, he questions why we even need such an explanation. ‘‘Most major¶ wars,’’ he writes, ‘‘are followed by periods, sometimes quite long periods, of relative¶ peace.’’ He asks why explanations offered for periods of peace after earlier wars aren’t¶ considered sufficient for the nuclear era.64 It would be easy to turn these questions on¶ their head. Why should analysts fall back on facile explanations for peace such as ‘‘war¶ weariness,’’ ‘‘economic exhaustion,’’ and ‘‘domestic political distraction’’ that are largely¶ disconnected from international relations theory?¶ At least through the 1970s, the United States and Soviet Union were ideologically¶ hostile, mutually suspicious, and fearful of each other. In the early Cold War period, US¶ public political discourse often addressed American desires to ‘‘roll back’’ the Soviet¶ domination of Eastern Europe, and the national security establishment contemplated¶ preventive wars against the Soviet Union and China.65 For much of the Cold War, the¶ Soviet Union was not a ‘‘status quo state.’’ So if not fear of nuclear war, what was it that¶ kept such virulently adversarial foes at arm’s length? Answering this question was beyond¶ the scope of Wilson’s essay, but acknowledging it should not have been.

#### Security is life-affirming

**Booth ‘5**

(Ken Booth, Prof. of IR @ Wales, ‘5 [Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 22]

The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities. Look around. What is immediately striking is that some degree of insecurity, as a life determining condition, is universal. To the extent an individual or group is insecure, to that extent their life choices and chances **are taken away**; this is because of the resources and energy they need to invest in seeking safety from domineering threats - whether these are the lack of food for one’s children or organizing to resist a foreign aggressor. The corollary of the relationship between insecurity and a determined life is that **a degree of security creates life possibilities**. Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with **opening up space in people’s lives.** This allows for individual and collective **human becoming** - the capacity to have some choice about living differently - consistent with the same but different search by others. Two interrelated conclusions follow from this. First, security can be understood as an instrumental value; it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored. Second, security is synonymous simply with survival. One can survive without being secure (the experience of refugees in long-term camps in war-torn parts of the world, for example). Security is therefore **more than mere** animal survival (basic animal existence). It is survival-plus, the plus being the **possibility to explore human becoming**, As an instrumental value, security is sought because it frees people(s) to some degree to do other than deal with threats to their human being. The achievement of a level of security - and security is always relative - gives to individuals and groups some time, energy, and scope to chose to be or become, other than merely survival as human biological organisms. Security is an important dimension of the process by which the human species can reinvent itself beyond the merely biological.

#### Structural violence makes the perfect the enemy of the good—their totalizing understanding of violence ignores that certain ideals are independent of each other. Preventing war is a good thing, even if it allows structural conflict to continue

Coady ‘7

(C.A.J, Australian philosopher with an international reputation for his research in both epistemology and political and applied philosophy, Morality and Political Violence, pg. 28, 2007, Cambridge University Press)

First, let us look briefly at the formulation of his definition, which has some rather curious features. It seems to follow from it that a young child is engaged in violence if its expression of its needs and desires is such that it makes its mother and/or father very tired, even if it is not in any ordinary sense “a violent child” or engaged in violent actions. Furthermore, I will be engaged in violence if, at your request, I give you a sleeping pill that will reduce your actual somatic and mental realisations well below their potential, at least for some hours. Certainly some emendation is called for, and it may be possible to produce a version of the definition that will meet these difficulties (the changing of “influenced” to “influenced against their will” might do the job, but at the cost of making it impossible to act violently toward someone at their request, and that doesn’t seem to be impossible, just unusual). I shall not dwell on this, however, because I want rather to assess Galtung’s reason for seeking to extend the concept of violence in the way he does. His statement of the justification of his definition is as follows: “However, it will soon be clear why we are rejecting the narrow concept of violence according to which violence is somatic incapacitation, or deprivation of health, alone (with killing as the extreme form), at the hands of an actor who intends this to be the consequence. If this were all violence is about, and peace is seen as its negation, then too little is rejected when peace is held up as an ideal. Highly unacceptable social orders would still be compatible with peace. Hence an extended concept of violence is indispensable but the concept should be a logical extension, not merely a list of undesirables.”16 So, for Galtung, the significance of his definition of violence lies in the fact that if violence is undesirable and peace desirable, then if we draw a very wide bow in defining violence we will find that the ideal of peace will commit us to quite a lot. Now it seems to me that this justification of the value of his definition is either muddled or mischievous (and just possibly both). If the suggestion is that peace cannot be a worthy social ideal or goal of action unless it is the total ideal, then the suggestion is surely absurd. A multiplicity of compatible but non-inclusive ideals seems as worthy of human pursuit as a single comprehensive goal, and, furthermore, it seems a more honest way to characterize social realities. Galtung finds it somehow shocking that highly unacceptable social orders would still be compatible with peace, but only the total ideal assumption makes this even surprising. It is surely just an example of the twin facts that since social realities are complex, social ideals and ills do not form an undifferentiated whole (at least not in the perceptions of most men and women), and that social causation is such that some ideals are achievable in relative independence from others. Prosperity, freedom, peace, and equality, for instance, are different ideals requiring different characterisations and justifications, and although it could be hoped that they are compatible in the sense that there is no absurdity in supposing that a society could exhibit a high degree of realization of all four, concrete circumstances may well demand a trade-off amongst them–the toleration, for example, of a lesser degree of freedom in order to achieve peace, or of less general prosperity in the interests of greater equality.

#### Actors are generally rational – claiming they aren’t creates a self-fulfilling prophecy that makes conflict inevitable

Roger Myerson, winner of the 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics and Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, 2007. “Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game Theorist’s Perspective,” http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/

Game-theoretic analysis is based on an assumption that people are rational. Of course nobody is perfectly rational; we all make mistakes. But to get a sense of what people are likely to do in any given situation, it is generally a good idea to think about what their interests are and to assume that they will act to pursue these interests. Our adversaries’ interests may be different from our own, but we generally share at least some common interests, such as avoiding the costs of destructive conflict. But it may be asked: What if our adversaries are irrational or congenital aggressors who cannot be deterred? If so, what could we do but try to bind them or destroy them? We should be very cautious about jumping to such conclusions. After all, if our adversaries understood that we believed this about them, so that our perceived self-interest would require their destruction, then their struggle against us actually could become rational self-defense for them. Thus we should not lightly contemplate such self-fulfilling prophecies of congenital violence and mortal struggle. It is generally much safer to assume that our adversaries will respond appropriately to a firm deterrent strategy when our resolve and restraint are both made clear to them.

#### Fracturing ideas of masculinity only results in more conflict

Marysia Zalewski, Reader in the Centre for Women’s Studies, and Jane Parpart, professor of Gender Studies at University of Dalhousie, 98 [The 'Man' Question in International Relations, Westview Press, Boulder, p76]

Central though this binary conception of gender is to much of Western thought, it presents an illusory dichotomous opposition between genders that obscures important distinctions within masculinity and femininity. Interestingly enough, once the idea of fractures within Western conceptions of masculinity and femininity is accepted, the division between what is masculine and what is feminine tends to be less clear. Fractures within masculinity have played a crucial part in defining the relationships between the two orthodox paradigms in IR: namely realism and liberal internationalism. The division of orthodox IR into two different masculine camps has led to a competition between two aspiring hegemonic masculinities over which is more masculine (real and objective) and which should be regarded as inferior and feminine (subjective and normative)

#### Post-Cold War conceptions of peace are false → the world is inevitably realist

Ikenberry 01

(G. John, reviewing John J. Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, November/December 2001, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57267/g-john-ikenberry/the-tragedy-of-great-power-politics) SLS

Mearsheimer boldly states that great-power rivalry is not over. The major powers still fear each other, and dangerous security competition lurks. This view is built on an "offensive realist" theory of world politics: the deep insecurity generated by the anarchic (hence "tragic") international system leads great powers to act aggressively toward each other, thwarting rivals from gaining power even if such moves risk war. Moreover, great powers are rarely satisfied with the status quo and instead seek hegemony. Mearsheimer tests his theory across the last two centuries, citing the territorial conquests of Japan and Germany before 1945 and Soviet policies after 1917 as evidence. The United States and the United Kingdom do not fit as well into Mearsheimer's framework, but he argues that the "offshore balancing" strategies of these maritime states are just more sophisticated versions of calculated aggression. As a result, Mearsheimer predicts, the post-Cold War peace among great powers will soon end: without a peer competitor in Europe or Asia, the United States will retract its security commitments there and great-power security competition will return. But he does not make clear why the United States would act in this way -- even if it is a sophisticated power maximizer.

No link– there is no one form of ‘manhood’ in IR that we reinforce

Marysia Zalewski, Reader in the Centre for Women’s Studies, and Jane Parpart, professor of Gender Studies at University of Dalhousie, 98 [The 'Man' Question in International Relations, Westview Press, Boulder, p203-4]

The assertion that international politics and relations is a "man's affair" of course presupposes a single, biologically based, and largely AngloAmerican vision of masculinity. [16](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/98143764) Whereas most of the chapters in the book are situated within this cultural context, no single agreed standard of masculinity comes to the fore. Indeed, one is struck by the variety and richness of definitions of manhood and masculinity that emerge. Steve Niva described a series of shifts in the dominant/hegemonic conceptions of masculinity in the United States. The defeat in Vietnam undermined the longheld myth of the American frontiersman-warrior only to fuel a remasculinization of America in the Ramboized rhetoric of Reagan and Bush. Panama and the Gulf War thus played a central role in the reassertion and redefinition of American masculinity. To Cynthia Weber, the hypermasculine posturing during the Panama invasion signaled not strength but male hysteria over the loss of American hegemonic power. Perhaps these cracks in U.S. hegemony explain the shift to a new definition of (superior) manhood described by Niva. This new "tough but tender" version of hegemonic masculinity ridicules the "insensitive" hypermasculinity of Saddam Hussein and Manuel Noriega, celebrating instead the "new" American man who is morally responsive, sensitive to the needs of women and children, and yet able to kick butt when needed. The possibility that there is one, biologically based, predictable set of characteristics that define a "real man" dissolves in this complexity. Male associations with power, especially over women, youth, and subordinate males, are widespread (both historically and in the present), but definitions of masculinity(ies) obviously vary over time and place. [17](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/98143764) The historical context, the economic, political, and cultural/social factors at play at any given time, clearly have profound implications for the way manhood and masculinities are understood and maintained. As Spike Peterson and Jacqui True reminded us, new times require new ways of thinking about gender relations and manhood/masculinity(ies). I would argue that "old times" require (re)analysis as well, for definitions of manhood and masculinity(ies) have surely varied in the past. Indeed, colonialism and imperialism profoundly shaped the emergence of a hegemonic version of Euramerican manhood, which benefited from being compared with colonial images of soft and effeminate or warriorlike but technically "backward" colonial males

#### Linear thinking is about anticipation, not explanation—allows us to become resilient in the face of complexity

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(Dr. Randolph C., “Planning from the future: an emerging agenda”, International Review of the Red Cross, 2011, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-884-kent.pdf>)

The art of anticipation is not about prediction; it is about promoting a sense that exploring the ‘what might be’s’ is a recognized asset for the objectives of the organization and its ensuing policies. 38 While it would be wrong to argue against the fact that there are growing scientiﬁc and technological capacities to predict a vast range of phenomena – social as well as natural – it would be equally wrong to ignore the ever-present prospect of ‘black swan’ events and the extraordinary consequences of ‘the ﬂap of the wings of a butterﬂy’. 39 The organization has to be sensitive to the possibility that it will have to contend with the unforeseen and that its conventional standard operating procedures and repertoires will not necessarily be adequate for dealing with the unforeseen. Anticipation is ultimately about ensuring that the organization and policy-makers promote and foster the ﬂexibility and creativity necessary to deal with uncertainty and complexity. In so saying, there is a combination of inter-related steps that can achieve those aims for the institution as a whole and for individuals within those institutions, two of which are noted below. From a process perspective, it is essential that throughout the organization there is a sense that speculation – new ways of thinking and exploring at the limits of plausibility – is not only accepted but valued. All too often, the creative essence needed to speculate about the ‘what might be’s’ is sacriﬁced by managers’ pursuit of productivity, efﬁciency, and control. As noted by the Asian Development Bank’s Knowledge Solution, To manage for creativity and innovation in ways that keep clients, audiences, and partners satisﬁed, they have ﬁve levers: i) the amount of challenge they give to personnel to stimulate minds, ii) the degree of freedom they grant around procedures and processes to minimize hassle, iii) the way they design work groups to tap ideas from all ranks, (iv) the encouragement and incentives they give, which should include rewards and recognition, and (v) the nature of organizational support. 40 From a more instrumental perspective, a study of future consequences of climate change suggests that an essential way to develop means to deal with the possible consequences of change is to identify ‘a sequence of steps, each with associated uncertainties’. The ﬁrst emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols need to be speciﬁed, but so, too, will their dependence on unknown socio-economic behaviour. These unknowns can be tackled by using scenarios designed to produce indicative rather than deﬁnitive analysis. 41 The scenario – both as a concept and as a practical planning device – accepts the value of relative probabilities. In other words, one accepts that deﬁnitive explanation will be less probable in attempting to understand the future and that one will have to accept the need to plan based on a set of compelling probabilities. Scenario planning is intended to help management ‘think outside the box’, or to serve as ‘mind-shifting exercises’. At the same time, it is used to provide ‘high-level descriptions that help to clarify very long-term strategic direction, threats and opportunities’. 42 Scenario planning begins with making various assumptions and track them through different worlds, to provide an array of possibilities.

#### Complexity cannot be applied to the social sciences—it’s nothing more than a metaphor

Ford ’11

(Christopher, “Policymaking at the Edge of Chaos: Musings on Political Ideology Through the Lens of Complexity”, Hudson Institute, January 2011, <http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Conceptualizing%20Ideology.pdf>)

How might one respond to this predicament? Despair, of course, is one option. After losing money in the collapse of the infamous South Sea Bubble investment scheme, Sir Isaac Newton allegedly observed in frustration that “I can calculate the motions of heavenly bodies, but not the madness of men.” If the human world of complex adaptive social systems is indeed fundamentally non-predictable and non-manipulable in any kind of deliberate way over the long term, is public policymaking in the end no more than a vain conceit – a sort of joke we play on ourselves rather than admit our powerlessness, or perhaps an outright fraud promulgated by those in positions of power in order to justify their existence? Such despair seems premature, however, in part because we cannot be entirely sure how to translate lessons from Complexity Theory from the realm of mathematics and hard science into the world of human interactions. As a tentative response to Complexity’s seeming subversion of the policymaking paradigm, in fact, we might suspect it possible – without too much traducing our emerging understanding of Complexity in social science applications – that some types of policy input seem more likely to have significant effects upon operational behavior and long-term systemic patterns in the human world than others. We might also suspect that some of these inputs may indeed also operate in ways that are less stubbornly “unpredictable” than Complexity might at first seem to indicate. The key point here is that human actors are not easily analogized to the constituent elements of most of the complex adaptive systems studied by Complexity scientists. Complexity thinkers have indeed been intrigued by the possibilities their insights might offer when applied to social systems. They are also often rightly concerned, however, that human organizations “cannot be totally assimilated to natural systems, where laws are immutable,” because the structure of a human system probably changes in special ways due to “the action of actors inside and outside the organization.” 26 In this vein, Complexity scholars have sometimes suggested that the very humanity of the unit-level components of a human social system may to some extent make the lessons of Complexity themselves somewhat unpredictable. David Harvey and Michael Reed, for instance, have noted “the ‘wild card’ nature of human beings and their innovative abilities” as a sort of potential “exceptionality … in dissipative systems theory.” This does not necessarily mean that Complexity cannot be used in the study of social systems, but they stress that one must always be aware of the wild card and “recognize the indeterminate aspect of human nature.” 27 There seems, in fact, to be some debate not just about whether Complexity insights offer any real “tangible solutions” to the problems studied in the social sciences, but about whether Complexity can be applied there – at all – in anything more than a “metaphorical” fashion. 28 Peter Stewart, for instance, questions the possibility of applying Complexity analytically in the social sciences. He suspects that adequate analysis of complex phenomena cannot really be done there at all, 29 because “[s]ocial processes and phenomena are far too complex for complexity theory to deal with, or profoundly elucidate,” and “complexity theories do not provide a particularly effective metatheory of social processes” in the first place. 30 Harvey and Reid appear more optimistic, but even they seem to think that merely metaphorical or impressionistic analyses may sometimes be all that one can bring to bear on human problems. In fact, they suggest the greater use of what they call “iconological modeling” – a “heavily intuitive” approach “rooted in a pictorial method, in visual correspondences rather than in deductive reasoning” and conventional methods of social scientific data collection and analysis. 31

#### Policymaking is possible in complex systems

(Christopher, “Policymaking at the Edge of Chaos: Musings on Political Ideology Through the Lens of Complexity”, Hudson Institute, January 2011, <http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Conceptualizing%20Ideology.pdf>)

It is important to keep such concerns in mind when attempting to leap from the hard to the soft sciences, but it seems too early to give up. In fact, one might imagine there to be reason to believe that the policymaker’s paradox is not quite as debilitating as it might at first appear. Just how different human interactions are from those of molecules or the bundles of software code used in agent-based modeling, for instance, is no doubt a question on which experts will disagree. It would certainly seem to be true, however, that complex adaptive social systems – that is, the subset of complex adaptive systems the unit-level constituents of which happen to be sentient humans – are capable of responding to a type of input that no other complex system seems to be: ideational ones. Inputs at the level of conceptual organizing frameworks, narratives that structure people’s understandings and expectations of the world around them, seem to be important motivators for behavior in social systems and the political world. As Robert Artigiani has noted, complex systems – including societies and idea-systems – have ways to police themselves in order to maintain a degree of stability as they dance at the “Edge of Chaos.” This he conceives as helping give rise to the phenomenon of purpose or telos in a self-organized system, and the need for systemic self-maintenance “exerts top-down constraints on how members perceive and react to the world and ... how the world responds to their actions.” 32 It is in this fashion that “values, ethics, and morals” can be seen as helping “reprogram” behavior of individual humans in a system by mapping desired and undesired social states. Moral symbols stored in individual minds shape – though by no means rigidly determine – how individuals react in society. 33 Idea frameworks, therefore, can be important drivers for situational outcomes within complex adaptive social systems. Just as importantly – especially if one is looking for some way to escape, or at least attenuate, the erosive impact of Complexity upon the very possibility of public policy – it must also be observed that ideational inputs clearly can be deliberately manipulated, for good or ill, by members of the policymaking community. If there are ways to escape or at least attenuate the policymaker’s paradox, one of them may lie along these lines. Perhaps the deliberate shaping of ideas offers us a chance to affect behavior within complex systems in ways that are not utterly unpredictable, at least to the extent that such inputs will tend to exert recognizable patterning influences over time. This insight is, on one level, simply common sense. The units of a social system – human beings – are capable of purposive action motivated not merely by biological needs and raw emotions but by ideas: thought structures that shape their interpretation of the environment and evaluations of internal states, and which structure their responses to environmental conditions. The human units in a complex adaptive social system, in other words, exhibit a remarkable tendency to act upon ideas they have come to possess. These units also seem prone to act in ways that are, if not quite predictable, then at least identifiably related to the substantive content of the ideas they come to possess. One might thus suspect that interventions at the level of idea-systems – that is, policy inputs designed shape conceptual paradigms – offer at least some hope of deliberately achieving transformative effects in a complex adaptive social system.

## K

No epistemology is perfect, but we can use empiricism and logic to reason through our actions.

**Loewy ‘91** (Erich, associate professor of medicine at the University of Illinois and associate professor of humanities, “Suffering and the Beneficent Community: Beyond Libertarianism,” p. 17-21)

All of our judgments and decisions ultimately must be grounded in nonverifiable assumptions. The fundamentalist may deny this; but the fundamentalist grounds her judgments and decisions either in a religious belief based on revealed truth or, at least, on the assumption that “somewhere out there” truth exists and that we, in the human condition, can know it. Ultimately, or at least up to this point in time, absolute verification eludes man. At the extreme of this point of view, there are those who claim that truth is not only knowable, but is in fact, known and only the stubborn recalcitrance of the uninitiated prevents it from being generally accepted. This point of view claims not only that morality exists as a discoverable truth, an absolute not fashioned by men but unchanging and immutable, but also that truth has in fact been discovered. Rights and wrongs exist quite apart from the stage on which their application is played out. Situations may differ but, at most, such differences force us to reinterpret old and forever valid principles in a new light. Those who believe themselves to know the truth, furthermore, oftentimes feel compelled not only to persuade others to their point of view but feel morally justified in using considerable force to do so. On the other hand, some of us would deny the existence of immutable truth or, what is not quite the same thing, deny at least that it is knowable in the human condition. Those who flatly deny the existence of unalterable truth find themselves in much the same pickle as do those who flatly assert it: Both lack a standard of truth to which their affirmations can be appealed. Those who concede the possibility that truth exists but not the possibility that man in the human condition can be privy to it, have modified the position without greatly improving it. Their affirmation that man in the human condition can never know absolute truth seems more reasonable but is, once again, not verifiable. Who can know with certainty that tomorrow someone will not discover a way of “getting at” absolute truth and, in addition, be able to provide a simple and brilliant proof which other mortals to date have missed? Only an absolutist could deny such a possibility! That leaves us with a more pragmatic answer: Holding that, in the human condition, truth is not—or at least is not currently—accessible to us leaves more options open and does not fly in the face of the undeniable fact that, unlikely as it seems, our knowing absolute truth may be just around the corner. Outside the religious sphere, no one has ever convinced most thinking people that they are the possessors of absolute truth. Truth, whenever accepted at least for daily use, is invariably hedged. If we accept the fact that absolute truth (at least so far) is unknown to us and accept as an axiom that it may well be unknowable, we are left with a truth which for everyday use is fashioned rather than discovered. What is and what is not true or what is and what is not morally acceptable, therefore, varies with the culture in which we live. This claim (the claim on which, as we shall see, cultural relativism relies) rests on the assertion that there are many ways of looking at truths and that such truths are fashioned by people. Depending on our vantage point, there are many visions of reality,1a fact which the defenders of this doctrine hold to be valid in dealing with the concrete, scientific reality of chemistry and physics.2Such a claim, it would seem, is even more forceful when dealing with morals. As Engelhardt puts it so very well: “Our construals of reality exist within the embrace of cultural expectations.”3And our “construals of reality” include our vision of the moral life. Furthermore, not only do our “visions of reality occur within the embrace of cultural expectations,” the limits of what we as humans can and what we cannot culturally (or otherwise) expect are biologically framed by the totality of our bodies and their capacities as well as (and inseparable from the rest of the body of which it is a part) by our minds. **All human judgments and decisions**, then, **are inevitably grounded to prior assumptions which we accept and do not question for now**. There is a story about William James which illustrates the point. James was giving a lecture dealing with the universe at a Chattauqua: one of those events so popular at the turn of the century, which has, regrettably, been replaced by talk shows. At the end of his well-received lecture, a little old lady came up to him and said: “I enjoyed your talk, Mr. James, but you know you are making an error: The universe rests on the back of a tortoise!” “Very well,” James said, “I can accept that. But tell me, what in turn does that other tortoise rest upon?”  “It’s no use, Mr. James, it’s tortoises all the way down.” And so it goes: **Every assumption rests on the back of another assumption and if we are to examine all before proceeding with our everyday judgments and decisions we would get hopelessly mired** in mud. **The quest is necessarily endless. Ethical theories, like all other human activities, inevitably rest on prior assumptions**. Indeed, one cannot reason without a framework of reasoning, and similarly, one cannot reason about reasoning without such a prior framework. The question, it seems, is not the necessary acceptance of an assumption, for that is inevitable, but the depth and universality of the assumption taken. One needs steer between Scylla and Charybdis: on one side too-easy acceptance of a superficial assumption, on the other an endless and almost neurotic quest for ever more basic assumptions. Crashing on the other condemns one to eternal philosophical backpedaling, inactivity, and to leaving the original problem, whose immediate resolution may be critically needed, entirely unresolved. That some framework of reasoning is necessary was recognized by Kant when he claimed that, thanks to the “common structure of our mind,” thought processes inevitably divided the sensible world into categories which we then use to deal with it.4Rationality requires ways of dealing with the world and reasoning without categories is evidently not possible. The reason why there is no disagreement among persons about some logical propositions is that the common structure of our mind compels us to see certain things in certain ways and to reason along certain lines made inevitable by the very way in which our minds are structured. Even if, later on, we may discover that our universally agreed-upon proposition was wrong, we make this discovery using the same tools. We merely discover that some crucial fact was missing, some critical point not considered. The same basic method of reasoning and the same biological substrate for reasoning (the common structure of our mind) has been used to discover our error. I do not claim that our common biology and the common structure of our minds constitutes a way of discovering absolute truth. What such a common biology and such a common structure imply is that we inevitably will approach problems, see truth, and derive our judgments within such a bodily framework. **We are condemned** (or blessed) **to know the sensible world and to reason from the data presented to us and organized by us in certain and not in other ways. That does not reveal truth to us, but it presents us with a working model to be used, adapted, and learned from.** **The belief that there are no absolutes**(or that, at the very least, they are inaccessible to us in the human condition) **can lead to a moral nihilism in which no firm judgments can be made and no decisions or actions can be undertaken**. Such a moral nihilism claims that truths are fashioned by people and however a person may choose to fashion his truths serves no better than does any other way of constructing truths. The fashioning of truths, in that point of view,lacks its own frame of reference. It does not necessarily follow from this, however, that since our “construals of reality” occur purely within the “embrace of cultural expectations,” all visions of reality that are necessarily of equal worth, or that there are no generally useful standards that we can employ in judging either what we conceive to be physical or ethical reality. One can, for example, claim that some visions of reality are clearly and demonstrably wrong, and support such a claim by empirical observation or by showing that certain visions of reality simply do not work That is the stronger claim. In rejoinder, it can be said that empirical observations and “what works” are themselves part of the framework and that, therefore, such a claim lacks validity. On the other hand, one can make the somewhat weaker claim that certain visions, in the context of a given society and historical epoch, seem less valid than others because they confound careful observation or because they simply fail to work when applied to real situations occurring in real current societies.5This leaves room for a form of modified cultural relativism. Such a move does not deny that our “visions of reality occur within the embrace of cultural expectations.” But while such a move affirms that there are many realities of similar worth, it also suggests that within the context of such cultural expectations some realities have little, and others have much, validity. **Some realities work (have explanatory power translatable into action and are, therefore, usable) in the context of our experience and community, while some do not, and some work better than do others**. **Such a view neither throws up its hands and grants automatic equal worth nor rigidly enforces one view: It looks upon the problem as one of learning and growth in which realities (both empirical and ethical) are neither rigidly fixed nor entirely subject to ad hoc interpretation**. Ethical certitude, no more than certitude about anything else, is not possible in the human condition. The “ut in pluribus,” the generally and for the most part true of which St. Thomas Aquinas speaks, is the best we can hope for in science as well as in ethics. Since, however, we must inevitably act (nonaction being as much action as action itself), we must be prepared to act on less than complete certitude. Truth cannot, in a Cartesian sense, be expected to be apodictic; rather truth (whether it is scientific or moral truth) is to be worked with, shaped and developed as we experience, learn, and grow.

#### No prior questions – our justification for the 1AC is true

Owen ‘2 – reader of political theory

(David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation **of ontology** and epistemologypromotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates **a** theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general **explanations** for classes of phenomena **is a question** for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Extinction first – always VTL

Bernstein ‘2

(Richard J., Vera List Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research, “Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation”, p. 188-192)

There is a basic value inherent in **organic** being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life" (IR 81). 15 "The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being" (IR 81-2). Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power. But precisely this transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics. Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human action so radically that the underlying premises of traditional ethics are no longer valid. For the first time in history human beings possess the knowledge and the power to destroy life on this planet, including human life. Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for life. The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." We need, Jonas argued, a new categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; or expressed negatively: "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"; or simply: "Do not compromise **the conditions for** an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth**"; or again turned positive:** "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will."

#### Alt doesn’t solve the Aff –

#### The aff’s method prioritizes observations without pragmatic strategy ---- continues to re-entrench the squo

Bryant 12 (Levi, Critique of the Academic Left, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)

I must be in a mood today– half irritated, half amused –because I find myself ranting. Of course, that’s not entirely unusual. So this afternoon I came across a post by a friend quoting something discussing the environmental movement that pushed all the right button. As the post read,¶ For mainstream environmentalism– conservationism, green consumerism, and resource management –humans are conceptually separated out of nature and mythically placed in privileged positions of authority and control over ecological communities and their nonhuman constituents. What emerges is the fiction of a marketplace of ‘raw materials’ and ‘resources’ through which human-centered wants, constructed as needs, might be satisfied. The mainstream narratives are replete with such metaphors [carbon trading!]. Natural complexity,, mutuality, and diversity are rendered virtually meaningless given discursive parameters that reduce nature to discrete units of exchange measuring extractive capacities. Jeff Shantz, “Green Syndicalism”¶ While finding elements this description perplexing– I can’t say that I see many environmentalists treating nature and culture as distinct or suggesting that we’re sovereigns of nature –I do agree that we conceive much of our relationship to the natural world in economic terms (not a surprise that capitalism is today a universal). This, however, is not what bothers me about this passage.¶ What I wonder is just what we’re supposed to do even if all of this is true? What, given existing conditions, are we to do if all of this is right? At least green consumerism, conservation, resource management, and things like carbon trading are engaging in activities that are **making** real **differences**. From this passage– and maybe the entire text would disabuse me of this conclusion –it sounds like we are to reject all of these interventions because they remain tied to a capitalist model of production that the author (and myself) find abhorrent. The idea seems to be that if we endorse these things we are tainting our hands and would therefore do well to reject them altogether.¶ The problem as I see it is that this is **the worst sort of abstraction** (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ Unfortunately, **the academic left** falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at **proposing** any sort of **realistic constructions** of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a **workable alternative**. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:

The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶

Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶

Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows:

¶ Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶

Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, **we express them in ways that** only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing?¶ But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the **greatest friend** of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people **into** the embrace of **reigning ideology** than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done!¶ But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our **critique-intoxicated cynics** and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶ What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation.¶ “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.

#### Despite every flaw in calculating risk of human existence, we are still right: you have to weigh survival as an a priori question and sculpt deliberate policies to protect humanity.

**Matheny, 7**—[Jason, Department of Health Policy and Management, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University. “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction.” Risk Analysis. Vol 27, No 5, 2007, http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2007\_orig-articles/2007-10-15-reducingrisk.html]

9. Conclusion We may be poorly equipped to recognize or plan for extinction risks (Yudkowsky, 2007). We may not be good at grasping the significance of very large numbers (catastrophic outcomes) or very small numbers (probabilities) over large timeframes. We struggle with estimating the probabilities of rare or unprecedented events (K5unreuther *et al*., 2001). Policymakers may not plan far beyond current political administrations and rarely do risk assessments value the existence of future generations.18 We may unjustifiably discount the value of future lives. Finally, extinction risks are market failures where an individual enjoys no perceptible benefit from his or her investment in risk reduction. Human survival may thus be a good requiring deliberate policies to protect. It might be feared that consideration of extinction risks would lead to a *reductio ad absurdum*: we ought to invest all our resources in asteroid defense or nuclear disarmament, instead of AIDS, pollution, world hunger, or other problems we face today. On the contrary, programs that create a healthy and content global population are likely to reduce the probability of global war or catastrophic terrorism. They should thus be seen as an essential part of a portfolio of risk-reducing projects.

#### The Aff deploys risk in a fundamentally different means than what they criticize – the point is to imagine alternative futures, not fear them out of anxiety

Wimbush ‘8 – director of the Center for Future Security Strategies

(S. Enders, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and the author of several books and policy articles, “A Parable: The U.S.-ROK Security Relationship Breaks Down”, Asia Policy, Number 5 (January 2008), 7-24)

What if the U.S.-ROK security relationship were to break down? This essay explores the alternative futures of such a scenario. Analyzing scenarios is one technique for trying to understand the increasing complexity of strategic environments. A scenario is an account of an imagined sequence of events. The intent of a scenario is to suggest how alternative futures might arise and where they might lead, where conflicts might occur, how the interests of different actors might be challenged, and the kinds of strategies actors might pursue to achieve their objectives. Important to keep in mind is that scenarios are nothing more than invented, in-depth stories—stories about what different futures could look like and what might happen along plausible pathways to those futures. The trends and forces that go into building a scenario may be carefully researched, yet a scenario is not a research paper. Rather, it is a work of the imagination. As such, scenarios are, first, tools that can help bring order to the way analysts think about what might happen in future security environments; second, scenarios are a provocative way of revealing possible dynamics of future security environments that might not be apparent simply by projecting known trends into the future. Scenarios are particularly useful in suggesting where the interests and actions of different actors might converge or collide with other forces, trends, attitudes, and influences. By using scenarios, to explore the question “what if this or that happened?” in a variety of different ways, with the objective of uncovering as many potential answers as possible, analysts can build hedging strategies for dealing with many different kinds of potential problems. Though they may choose to discount some of these futures and related scenarios, analysts will not be ignorant of the possibilities, with luck avoiding having to say: “I never thought about that.”

#### Apocalyptic imagery is key to genuine resistance to problematic security structures

**Schatz 12** (JL, Binghamton U, "The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-­‐Of-­‐ The-­‐World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism," The Journal of Ecocriticism: Vol 4, No 2 (2012))

Any **hesitancy to deploy images of apocalypse** out of the risk of acting in a biopolitical manner **ignores** how any particular metaphor—apocalyptic or not—**always risks getting co--‐opted**. It does not excuse inaction. Clearly hegemonic forces have already assumed control of determining environmental practices when one looks at the debates surrounding off--‐shore drilling, climate change, and biodiversity within the halls of Congress. “As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems … will go unsolved … only to fester more ominously into the future. … [E]cological crisis … cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context … of internationalized markets, finance, and communications” (Boggs 774). If it weren’t for people such as Watson connecting things like whaling to the end of the world it wouldn’t get the needed coverage to enter into public discourse. It takes big news to make headlines and hold attention spans in the electronic age. Sometimes it even takes a reality TV show on Animal Planet. As Luke reminds us, “Those who dominate the world exploit their positions to their advantage **by defining how the world is known**. Unless they also face resistance, questioning, and challenge from those who are dominated, **they** certainly **will remain the dominant forces**” (2003: 413). Merely sitting back and theorizing over metaphorical deployments does a **grave injustice** to the gains activists are making on the ground. It also **allows hegemonic institutions to continually define the debate** over the environment by framing out any attempt for significant change, whether it be radical or reformist. Only by jumping on every opportunity for resistance can ecocriticism have the hopes of combatting the current ecological reality. This means we must recognize that **we cannot fully escape the master’s house** since the surrounding environment always shapes any form of resistance. Therefore, **we ought to act even if we may get co--‐opted.** As Foucault himself reminds us, “instead of radial ruptures more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in a society that shift about[.] … And it is doubtless the strategic codification of these points of resistance that makes a revolution possible, somewhat similar to the way in which the state relies on the institutional integration of power relationships. It is in this sphere of force relations that we must try to analyze the mechanisms of power” (96--‐97). Here Foucault “asks us to think about resistance differently, as not anterior to power, but a component of it. If we take seriously these notions on the exercise and circulation of power, then we … open … up the field of possibility to talk about particular kinds of environmentalism” (Rutherford 296). This is not to say that all actions are resistant. Rather, the revolutionary actions that are truly resistant oftentimes appear mundane since it is more about altering the intelligibility that frames discussions around the environment than any specific policy change. Again, this is why people like Watson use one issue as a jumping off point to talk about wider politics of ecological awareness. Campaigns that look to the government or a single policy but for a moment, and then go on to challenge hegemonic interactions with the environment through other tactics, allows us to codify strategic points of resistance in numerous places at once. Again, this does not mean we must agree with every tactic. It does mean that even failed attempts are meaningful. For example, while PETA’s ad campaigns have drawn criticism for comparing factory farms to the Holocaust, and featuring naked women who’d rather go naked than wear fur, their importance extends beyond the ads alone6. By bringing the issues to the forefront they draw upon known metaphors and reframe the way people talk about animals despite their potentially anti--‐Semitic and misogynist underpinnings. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s theorization of the multitude serves as an excellent illustration of how **utilizing the power of the master’s biopolitical tools can** become powerful enough to **deconstruct** its house **despite the risk of co--‐optation or backlash**. For them, the multitude is defined by the growing global force of people around the world who are linked together by their common struggles without being formally organized in a hierarchal way. While Hardt and Negri mostly talk about the multitude in relation to global capitalism, their understanding of the commons and analysis of resistance is useful for any ecocritic. They explain, [T]he multitude has matured to such an extent that it is becoming able, through its networks of communication and cooperation … [and] its production of the common, to sustain an alternative democratic society on its own. … Revolutionary politics must grasp, in the movement of the multitudes and through the accumulation of common and cooperative decisions, the moment of rupture … that can create a new world. In the face of the destructive state of exception of biopower, then, there is also a constituent state of exception of democratic biopolitics[,] … creating … a new constitutive temporality. (357) Once one understands the world as interconnected—instead of constructed by different nation--‐states and single environments—conditions in one area of the globe couldn’t be conceptually severed from any other. In short, we’d all have a stake in the global commons. Ecocritics can then **utilize biopolitics** to shape discourse and fight against governmental biopower by waking people up to the pressing need to inaugurate a new future for there to be any future. Influencing other people through argument and end--‐of--‐the--‐world tactics is not the same biopower of the state so long as it doesn’t singularize itself but for temporary moments. Therefore, “it is not unreasonable to hope that in a biopolitical future (after the defeat of biopower) war will no longer be possible, and the intensity of the cooperation and communication among singularities … will destroy its [very] possibility” (Hardt & Negri 347). In The context of capitalism, when wealth fails to trickle down it would be seen as a problem for the top since it would stand testament to their failure to equitably distribute wealth. In the context of environmentalism, not--‐in--‐my--‐backyard reasoning that displaces ecological destruction elsewhere would be exposed for the failure that it is. There is no backyard that is not one’s own. Ultimately, **images of planetary doom** demonstrate how we are all **interconnected** and in doing so inaugurate a **new world** where multitudes, and not governments, guide the fate of the planet.

#### Perm solves best – combination allows for better explanation of IR

Lake and Jacobs ‘11 – professor of social science and distinguished professor of political science

(David A. Lake is the Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego.., **Why "isms" are Evil: Theory, Epistemology and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress**, International Studies Quarterly 55, 465-480, weber.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeWhyIsmsareevil.pdf])

Rather than forming sects and debating theology, imagine the contributions that we as scholars could make if we devoted our professional and intellectual energies to studying things that matter. Imagine reorganizing our research and professional associations around problems, not approaches. Imagine as well a graduate ﬁeld seminar not organized around research traditions but topics like Global Climate Change, Growth and Development, Economic and Political Inequality, and Genocide and Political Violence. The seminar discussion could then focus on ‘‘what do we know’’ rather than ‘‘what are the central tenets of this particular sect’’?¶ Likewise, the International Studies Association is divided into relatively autonomous sections, many (but not all) of which are deﬁned by research tradition. Imagine instead sections on these same sorts of substantive topics—not the Scientiﬁc Study of International Processes but a section on War, not Feminist Theory and Gender Studies but Female Political Empowerment. We might then attend panels that focus, say, on what we know about economic inequality and, more important, what we learn from new research.¶ Professional practices are surprisingly robust things. Turning a discipline may be like turning a supertanker. As suggested, there are also individuals and organized interests vested in current professional practices, not least of which are the organizational gatekeepers who set themselves up as enforcers of purity and agenda-setters for the discipline. Institutionalized practices combined with entrenched and powerful elites militate against change.¶ But **much can be done**, I hope, **through the actions of individual scholars**. I no longer teach the ‘‘isms’’ at the introductory level or in ﬁeld seminars for graduate students. With Jeffry Frieden and Kenneth Schultz, I have written an undergraduate textbook that avoids sectarian debates and focuses on substantive topics (Frieden, Lake, and Schultz 2010). A volume I edited with Robert Powell, directed more at ﬁrst-year graduate students, explores this approach at a higher level (Lake and Powell 1999). Both are, I am gratiﬁed, well received, especially by younger scholars just starting their teaching careers. There is, I believe, a growing frustration with the dead hand of the isms and a quest for alternative ways of organizing intellectual inquiry. We can break free of the old order. A ﬁrst step in changing professional practice is to stop replicating that practice in our scholarly lives.¶ In addition, **we should embrace partiality**. That is, we should acknowledge that all current theories are partial and state explicitly their boundary and scope conditions. Modesty in acknowledging such limitations is actually in the self-interest of scholars. A common but too easy criticism to make of another’s work is ‘‘yes, you may explain that’’ **but ‘‘you can’t explain this,’’ where ‘‘this’’ happens to be the critic’s area of specialized knowledge tha**t, in turn, **supports her favored research tradition**. With properly stated boundary and scope conditions, we would know whether the theory was intended to apply to ‘‘this’’ and whether the critic makes a valid observation. Through changes in editorial policy, authors should be required to include a short paragraph on the boundary conditions of their analysis and to state explicitly what their theory cannot explain. Even if editors do not require it, we as individual reviewers can insist on it. More important, the end—deeper knowledge—will hopefully justify the embrace of partiality. **We are all touching different parts of the proverbial elephant**, even while claiming to be holding it in its entirety. **By pooling our knowledge of the different parts, we might then be able to describe the whole animal more effectively**. **We might also then have something constructive to say to policymakers who want to control the elephant.¶** This is not, I want to make clear, a plea for atheoretic or necessarily policy relevant research, although the latter certainly has its place. We need theories to explain real-world patterns, not merely to describe them. And we need basic theory to reveal causes even when they are not amenable to manipulation by policymakers. But we should, as Sil and Katzenstein (2010) argue, embrace analytic eclecticism. A single scholar ought to be able to work on questions of war with theories of rational unitary states, questions of global environmental change with theories of individual norms, and questions of trade policy with theories of sectors pursuing their material interests without fear of **being criticized for inconsistency**.

#### Realism defines security of energy issues

**Stephan et al. 11**

[Hannes R. Stephan, John Vogler, and Fariborz Zelli, “Energy Security and Climate Security: Synergy or Conflict?”, Paper presented at the Third Global International Studies Conference (17-20 August 2011, Porto, Portugal), August 17-20, 2011]

Historically, realist theoretical assumptions have dominated thinking on energy security. Widespread recognition of the role of energy resources during the build-up and conduct of the 5 Second World War ensured the status of energy as an issue belonging to the 'high' politics of national security. The role of energy as a "strategic good" par excellence is not only related to its essential function in 'fuelling' military activities. Its price level and availability also play a fundamental role in a country's economic performance and socio-political stability (Lesage et al. 2010: 183). For instance, there is considerable evidence that a large number of post-war recessions in the US have – at least partly – been caused by spikes in oil prices (Bordoff et al. 2009: 215). A realist interpretation of energy security was further reinforced by events in the 1970s when a trend towards the nationalisation of energy supplies and the sporadic use of oil embargoes, orchestrated by the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC), highlighted the dangers of energy dependence. Even today the privileged position of major energy-exporting countries still represents a constraint on the foreign policy agenda of major importers (Müller-Kraenner 2008: 27). Market expansion and low energy prices from the 1980s until the mid-2000s encouraged the development of liberal approaches to energy security. Greater diversification of sources, a gradual shift to coal and natural gas, and a consolidating world oil market all but eliminated the threat of an effective use of the 'oil weapon'. Well-functioning global markets for oil – and potentially for liquefied natural gas – have been increasingly promoted as effective mechanisms to provide cheaper energy inputs in an increasingly competitive, global economy and guard against both structural undersupply and short-term supply disruptions (Goldthau and Witte 2009). The US economy, for example, is now substantially less vulnerable to fluctuations in oil markets than in previous decades. However, realist notions of energy security have not been superseded. On the contrary, Brazil, Russia, India, and China – the so-called BRIC states – are not just consuming increasing amounts of fossil fuels. They also employ the traditional, statist tools of energy security policy such as bilateral contracts and the promotion of national energy champions (Lesage et al. 2010: 27). China and India have struck numerous energy deals with oil- and gas-exporting countries from the around the world, even if this has meant giving economic and military aid to 'pariah' states in Africa and Latin America (Müller-Kraenner 2008: 72). While this has served to raise rather than lower the availability of fossil fuels on global markets, **it demonstrates that – given an uncertain future – no major power will rely exclusively on the market allocation of energy supplies**. When it comes to natural gas, a commodity still largely reliant on pipeline infrastructure and long-term supply contracts, overtly political considerations have remained dominant. The European Union, although founded upon an agreement on coal and steel, has yet to produce a coherent energy policy or to perfect a ‘real internal energy market’ (Commission 2007:6). There are very significant differences in the energy mix and strategies of member states whose perspectives remain stubbornly national. Thus, the Commission’s principal approach has been to seek energy security through the perfection of a properly functioning, interconnected and transparent internal energy market. There has also been a largely 6 unsuccessful attempt to extend EU liberalising regulatory practices to the EU’s gas suppliers in its eastern ‘neigbourhood’. Failure was demonstrated in the twin Ukrainian gas crises of 2006 and 2009. In January 2009, ostensibly for commercial reasons (a dispute with Naftogaz of Ukraine) , Gazprom interrupted gas supplies with the serious knock-on effect of reducing EU gas availability by 20%, which affected 12 member states (Commission 2009: 7). The crisis again revealed the EU's vulnerability and the lack of internal planning and emergency coordination. It was only resolved through an EU-mediated political agreement between Russia and Ukraine (ibid: 4). Russia, having rejected the EU’s invitation to subscribe to the Energy Charter Treaty, increasingly relies on its economic power derived from natural resources and energy services. It uses the mechanism of 'pipeline politics' to compensate for its loss of superpower status and to preserve its zone of influence, particularly in the Caspian region and Central and Eastern Europe (Baran 2007; Müller-Kraenner 2008: 47-56). The EU counterpart is the suggestion that security of supply can be achieved through diversification involving new pipelines circumventing Russian territory, Nabucco providing the best known example. Youngs (2009) has suggested that in fact the EU is in fact caught on the horns of a dilemma, between attempts to install market based governance of energy supplies and an essentially realist approach to the geopolitics of pipelines. Certainly one of the significant outcomes of the gas crises has been the call for energy policy to play a major role in the Union’s external relations in building up a network of bilateral energy supply deals with its neighbours in the Caspian region, in North Africa and beyond (Commission 2007: 23). In the US, by contrast, new shale gas discoveries over the last few years have – for now – made the country virtually independent from imports. The situation is, of course, completely different for oil supplies even though the US – if it was minded to incur the costs – could achieve a degree of autarchy in this sector too.

#### Transition fails – attempting to resist security results in more power for powerful states and worse intervention

**McCormack 10**

[Tara McCormack, ’10, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 59-61)]

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of **problematising weak or unstable states** and allowing international institutions or major states **a more interventionary role**, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework **there were at least formal and clear demarcations**. This has the consequence of **entrenching international power inequalities** and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means **the condemnation of millions to** **a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival**. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and **ultimately lead to more power for powerful states**, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

#### Securitization is good – results in contesting antagonistic logic of security and breaks down competitive structures

**Trombetta ‘8** (Maria Julia Trombetta, (Delft University of Technology, postdoctoral researcher at the department of Economics of Infrastructures) 3/19/08 http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Trombetta-the\_securitization\_of\_the\_environment\_and\_the\_transformation\_of\_security.pdf

On the one hand, an approach that considers the discursive formation of security issues provides a new perspective to analyse the environmental security discourse and its transformative potential. First, it allows for an investigation of the political process behind the selection of threats, exploring why some of them are considered more relevant and urgent than others. The focus shifts from the threats to the collectivities, identities and interests that deserve to be protected and the means to be employed. Second, securitization suggests that the awareness of environmental issues can have a relevant role in defining and transforming political communities, their interests and identities, since the process creates new ideas about who deserve to be protected and by whom. Finally, as Behnke points out, **securitization can open the space for a “genuinely political” constitutive and formative struggle through which political structures are contested and reestablished**.(Behnke 2000: 91) Securitization allows for the **breaking and transforming of rules** that are no longer acceptable, **including the practices associated with an antagonistic logic of security**. On the other hand, securitization is problematic because of the set of practices it is supposed to bring about. For the CopS security “carries with it a history and a set of connotations that it cannot escape.”(Wæver 1995: 47) While securitizing an issue is a political choice, the practices it brings about are not. Accordingly, transforming an issue into a security issue is not always an improvement. In the case of the environment, the warning seems clear: “When considering securitizing moves such as ‘environmental security’...one has to weigh the always problematic side effects of applying a mind-set of security against the possible advantages of focus, attention, and mobilization.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 29) The School shares the normative suggestion that “[a] society whose security is premised upon a logic of war should be re-shaped, re-ordered, simply changed.”(Aradau 2001: introduction) For the CopS this does not mean to transform the practices and logic of security, because, as it will be shown below, for the School, this is impossible. The CopS suggests avoiding the transformation of issues into security issues. It is necessary “to turn threats into challenges; to move developments from the sphere of existential fear to one where they could be handled by ordinary means, as politics, economy, culture, and so on.”(Wæver 1995: 55, quoting Jahn). This transformation, for the CopS, is “desecuritization”, and the School has introduced a distinction between politicization - “meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resources allocation s”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 23) - and securitization - “meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 23) The slogan is: “less security, more politics!”(Wæver 1995: 56) Nevertheless, there are two major problems behind this suggestion. First, if securitization is normatively problematic, **desecuritization can be even more problematic**. It can lead to a **depoliticization and marginalisation of urgent and serious issues**, **while leaving unchallenged the practices associated with security**. In the case of the environment, many appeals to security are aimed at both soliciting action and transforming what counts as security and the way of providing it. Second, within the School’s framework, desecuritization cannot be possible. Securitization in fact can be inescapable, the unwanted result of discussing whether or not the environment is a security issue. As Huysmans has noticed, the performative, constitutive approach suggested by the speech act theory implies that even talking and researching about security can contribute to the securitization of an issue, even if that (and the practices associated with it) is not the desired result. “The normative dilemma thus consists of how to write or speak about security when the security knowledge risks the production of what one tries to avoid, what one criticizes: that is, the securitization of migration, drugs and so forth.”(Huysmans 2002: 43) When the understanding of security is the problematic one described by the CopS, research itself can become a danger. This captures a paradox that characterizes the debate about environmental security. As Jon Barnett has showed in The Meaning of Environmental Security (2001) the securitization of the environment can have perverse effects and several attempts to transform environmental problems into security issues have resulted in a spreading of the national security paradigm and the enemy logic, even if the intentions behind them were different. Barnett has argued that “environmental security is not about the environment, it is about security; as a concept, it is at its most meaningless and malign”(2001: 83) in this way, he seems to accept the ineluctability of the security mindset or logic evoked by securitization. However, his suggestion of promoting a “human centered” understanding of security, in which environmental security is not about (national) security but about people and their needs, within the securitization logic, cannot escape the trap he has described. Why, in fact, should the sort of his claim be different from that of similar ones? 2. The fixity of Security practices These dilemmas, however, are based on the idea that security practices are inescapable and unchangeable and the theory of securitization, as elaborated by the CopS, has contributed to suggest so. The CopS has achieved the result of making a specific, negative understanding of security – which has characterised the dominant Realist discourse within IR - appear as “natural” and unchangeable since all the attempts to transform it appear to reinforce its logic. To challenge this perverse mechanism it is necessary to unpack securitization further. First, it will be shown that securitization is not analytically accurate, the environment representing a relevant case. Second, the assumptions behind this problematic fixity will be explored. The CopS explores the specificity of the environmental sector in Security: A Framework for Analysis (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998) (Security hereafter), the theoretical book where the CopS illustrates the theory of securitization and analyses the dynamics of securitization within five relevant sectors. For each sector the School identifies the actors or objects (referent objects) that are threatened, specifies the relevant threats and the agents that promote or facilitate securitization.11[11] The environmental sector is rather different from the others and the transformative intent that is associated with the appeal to environmental security is more evident.12[12] Amongst the peculiarities of the environmental sector described by the School, three deserve a specific analysis for their implications: First, the presence of two agendas - a scientific and a political one; second, the multiplicity of actors; third, the politicization/securitization relationship. They will be analysed in turn “One of the most striking features of the environmental sector,” it is argued in Security, “is the existence of two different agendas: a scientific agenda and a political agenda.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 71) The scientific one refers mainly to natural science and non-governmental activities. The “scientific agenda is about the authoritative assessment of threat,”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 72) and Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde admit that “the extent to which scientific argument structures environmental security debates strikes us as exceptional.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 72) Quoting Rosenau, they suggest that “the demand for scientific proof is a broader emerging characteristic in the international system.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 72) This 11[11] So for instance in the military sector the referent object is usually the state and the threats are mainly military ones, while in the societal sector the referent objects are collective identities “that can function independent of the state, such as nations and religions.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 22-3) 12[12] This is the case even if the School adopts a conservative strategy that appears from the choice of the referent object (or what is threatened). In the first works of the School, the referent object within the environmental sector was the biosphere: “Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.” (Buzan 1991: 19) In Security the School narrows down this perspective and identifies the level of civilization (with all the contradictions that contribute to environmental problems) as the main referent object. This move favours a conservative perspective which considers the securitization of the environment as a way to preserve the status quo and the security strategies on which it is based. Despite this, the description of the environmental sector captures the specificity of the sector and reveals the tensions within the overall framework. questions the “self referentiality” of the speech act security. Are some threats more “real” than others thanks to scientific proof? Can considerations developed to characterize reflective behaviours be applied to natural systems? Even if dealing with these issues is beyond the scope of this article, it is necessary to note that the appeal to an external discourse has serious implications. First, it questions the possibility and opportunity of desecuritization. Is it possible and what does it mean to “desecuritize” an issue which is on the scientific agenda? If scientific research outlines the dangerousness of an environmental problem, how is it possible to provide security? Second, it suggests that security and the practices associated with it can vary from one sector to another and thus from one context to another. The second peculiarity of the environmental sector is the presence of many actors. This contrasts with Wæver’s suggestion that “security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites.”(Wæver 1995: 57) The multiplicity of actors is largely justified by the School with the relative novelty of the securitization of the environment. “The discourses, power struggles, and securitizing moves in the other sectors are reflected by and have sedimented over time in concrete types of organizations - notably states...nations (identity configurations), and the UN system,”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 71) however, this is not the case with the environment: “It is as yet undetermined what kinds of political structures environmental concerns will generate.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 71). In this way a tension appears since the attempts to securitize the environment are described as having a transforming potential, requiring and calling for new institutions. Within the environmental sector securitization moves seem to have a transformative intent that contrasts with the conservative one, that characterizes other sectors. The third peculiarity is that **many securitizing moves result in politicization. This is problematic for the School, which argues that “transcending a security problem by politicising it cannot happen through thematization in security terms, only away from such terms**.”(Wæver 1995: 56) For the School, once the enemy logic has been inscribed in a context, it is very difficult to return to an open debate. Nevertheless the various politicizations of environmental issues that followed the appeal to security – those the CopS dismissed as failed securitizations - seem to reinforce the argument, suggested by Edkins, that there is a tendency to politicize issues through their securitization. (Edkins 1999: 11) **This represents another signal that securitization**, within the environmental sector, **can take a different form, and that the problematic aspects of evoking security are not so evident.** Securitization theory, for the CopS, is meant to be descriptive, however the environmental sector suggests that some of its aspects prevent it from providing an adequate instrument for analysis. To understand why this occurs, it is necessary to explore in more detail the conceptualization of security by Wæver, who has introduced securitization within the School and is the strongest opponent of any attempt to securitize the environment.

#### No impact – security is self-reflective and speech act of debate leads to reflexivity

**Roe, 12** (Paul Roe, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Central European University, Budapest, “Is securitization a ‘negative’ concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics,” Security Dialogue vol. 43 no. 3, June 2012)

For the Copenhagen School, securitization represents a panic politics: we must do something now, as our very survival is at stake. In such a scenario, it is hardly surprising that Aradau and Huysmans both see the possibilities for debate and deliberation as being minimal: normal procedures must be circumvented, otherwise it might all be too late. The speed of decisionmaking and the accompanying silence on the part of those outside the relevant elite are made all the more salient by the so-called internalist (Stritzel, 2007) or philosophical (Balzacq, 2011) view of securitization, whereby the security speech act possesses its own performative power. The internalist reading is characteristic of Wæver’s (1995) earlier work on securitization and accords with the notion of performativity. Performativity corresponds to John L. Austin’s illocutionary act. Here, uttering security is more than just describing something: it is performing an action that creates new realities (Balzacq, 2005: 177, 2011: 20; Stritzel, 2007: 361). The security speech act thus has the power to enable emergency measures and to (re)order sociopolitical relations (friend/enemy, us/them). In other words, security is a self-referential practice. The internalist reading of securitization closely resembles the Schmittian conception of the political inasmuch as both are decisionist: the securitizing actor, like Schmitt’s sovereign, defines what is exceptional. The silence that arguably marks the internalist reading therefore reflects the lack of oversight to which the securitizing actor is subject, while, with regard to speed, there is a distinct sense of automaticity in the moment when a political issue is rapidly transformed into a matter of security by virtue of its very utterance as such. This is problematized, however, by the so-called externalist (Stritzel, 2007) or sociological (Balzacq, 2011**) view, which emphasizes instead the intersubjectivity of the securitization process.** With the externalist reading, the authority to speak and the power of the speech act itself are subject to the context in which security is uttered. Most importantly, **the framing of something as a security issue is not the sole preserve of the securitizing actor but must also be accepted by a relevant audience**. As Buzan et al. (1998: 25) make clear, presenting something as an existential threat is merely a ‘securitizing move’, as ‘the issue is [successfully] **securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such’**. Accordingly, with its emphasis on the intersubjective establishment of threat, **the externalist rendering of securitization makes problematic Wæver’s earlier assertion of security as a self-referential practice**. And this conceptual tension is reflected in the specific debate over the nature of the speech act itself. For both Thierry Balzacq and Holger Stritzel, Wæver/the Copenhagen School thus present securitization as both an illocutionary act and a perlocutionary act – that is, they discuss what is done in saying security, as well as what is done by saying security. Perlocutionary acts are external to the performative aspect of the speech act and thereby correspond not to the utterance itself but to its effects: did the securitizing actor manage to convince the relevant audience. Balzacq (2005: 177–8) sums up the situation thus: either we argue that securitization is a self-referential practice, in which case we forsake perlocution with the related acquiescence of the audience … or we hold fast to the creed that using the conception of security also produces a perlocutionary effect, in which case we abandon self-referentiality. He goes on: I suspect instead that the CS [Copenhagen School] leans towards the first option…. [A]lthough the CS appeals to an audience, its framework ignores the audience, which suggests that the CS opts for an illocutionary view of security yielding a ‘magical efficiency’ rather than a fully-fledged model encompassing perlocution as well (Balzacq, 2005: 177–8).9 It is indeed the case that the Copenhagen School has underconceptualized the role of the audience.10 This is something of which Wæver (2003) himself is well aware. But, it is debatable whether the Copenhagen School favours an internalist reading of the securitization concept. Although Wæver is keen to stress the importance of the ‘moment’ of the speech act, and thus retain its illocutionary force, he nevertheless also leans towards the importance of the relationship between securitizing actor and audience. Wæver warns of viewing securitization as a ‘unilateral performance’ – that undertaken only by the sovereign – and thus its equivalence to a ‘Schmittian anti-democratic decisionism’. Rather: We [members of the Copenhagen School] preserve the event-ness of the speech act and the performative moment, but locate it in-between the actors…. This might look like perlocution because it includes something after the speaker’s first action, but if the speech act is viewed as a larger whole including audience, it is more appropriate to see securitization as what is done in the (collective) act, rather than dissolving the move into one component of a larger complex social explanation of processes (Wæver, 2007: 4). The important point here is how the security speech act moves away from a Schmittian to an Arendtian conception of politics, ‘because the theory places power in-between humans … and insists on securityness being a quality not of threats but of their handling, that is, the theory places power not with “things” external to a community but internal to it’ (Wæver, 2011: 468). For Wæver, securitization thus **takes place in a context where there is space for open politics**: actors and audiences together agree as to what constitutes security and what does not. This is not to say that agreement is necessarily reached on an equal basis, as actors often possess, and indeed employ, the resources to cajole and bully audiences into acquiescing to their depiction of events. But, it is to say that some kind of agreement is nevertheless required. Indeed, the potential for securitization to avoid its Schmittian connotations in this way is also recognized by Williams. For Williams, the importance of the audience relates to a ‘discursive ethics’ that goes against the decisionist account of securitization. **The security speech act entails the possibility of dialogue and thereby also the potential for the transformation of security** (Williams, 2003: 522–3). And although Williams (2003: 524) seems somewhat sceptical as to the extent to which securitizations are subject to such ‘discursive legitimation’ – also noting how security issues often ‘operate in the realm of secrecy, of “national security”, of decision’ – he nonetheless makes clear the potential for securitizations to be ‘pulled back’ into the public realm, ‘particularly when the social consensus underlying the capacity for decision is challenged, either by questioning the policies, or by disputing the threat, or both’.

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#### Root cause logic is poor scholarship

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(Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 231 – 233)

We realise that this argument, which we propose as a new ‘quilting’ framework to explain Žižek’s theoretical oscillations and political prescriptions, raises some large issues of its own. While this is not the place to further that discussion, we think its analytic force leads into a much wider critique of ‘Theory’ in parts of the latertwentieth- century academy, which emerged following the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1960s and 1970s in the wake of the collapse of Marxism. Žižek’s paradigm to try to generate all his theory of culture, subjectivity, ideology, politics and religion is psychoanalysis. But a similar criticism would apply, for instance, to theorists who feel that the method Jacques Derrida developed for criticising philosophical texts can meaningfully supplant the methodologies of political science, philosophy, economics, sociology and so forth, when it comes to thinking about ‘the political’. Or, differently, thinkers who opt for Deleuze (or Deleuze’s and Guattari’s) Nietzschean Spinozism as a new metaphysics to explain ethics, politics, aesthetics, ontology and so forth, seem to us candidates for the same type of **criticism, as a reductive passing over** the **empirical and analytic distinctness of** the **different** object **fields in complex societies.** In truth, we feel that Theory, and the continuing line of ‘master thinkers’ who regularly appear particularly in the English- speaking world, is the last gasp of what used to be called First Philosophy. The philosopher ascends out of the city, Plato tells us, from whence she can espie the Higher Truth, which she must then bring back down to political earth. From outside the city, we can well imagine that she can see much more widely than her benighted political contemporaries. But from these philosophical heights, we can equally suspect that the ‘master thinker’ is also **always in danger of passing over** the **salient differences** and features of political life – differences only too evident to people ‘on the ground’. Political life, after all, is always a more complex affair than a bunch of ideologically duped fools staring at and enacting a wall (or ‘politically correct screen’) of ideologically produced illusions, from Plato’s timeless cave allegory to Žižek’s theory of ideology. We know that Theory largely understands itself as avowedly ‘post- metaphysical’. It aims to erect its new claims on the gravestone of First Philosophy as the West has known it. But it also tells us that people very often do not know what they do. And so it seems to us that too many of its proponents and their followers are mourners who remain in the graveyard, propping up the gravestone of Western philosophy under the sign of some totalising account of absolutely everything – enjoyment, différance, biopower . . . Perhaps the time has come, we would argue, less for one more would- be global, allpurpose existential and political Theory than for a **multi- dimensional and interdisciplinary** critical **theory** that would challenge the chaotic specialisation neoliberalism speeds up in academe, which mirrors and accelerates the splintering of the Left over the last four decades. This would mean that we would have to shun the hope that one method, one perspective, or one master thinker could single- handedly decipher all the complexity of socio- political life, the concerns of really existing social movements – which specifi cally does not mean mindlessly celebrating difference, marginalisation and multiplicity as if they could be suffi cient ends for a new politics. **It would be to reopen critical theory and non- analytic philosophy to the other intellectual disciplines**, most of **whom** today **pointedly reject Theory’s legitimacy,** neither reading it nor taking it seriously.